Explaining young children's difficulty on the false belief task: Representational deficits or context‐sensitive knowledge?

Dalke, Deborah Elizabeth

doi:10.1111/j.2044-835x.1995.tb00675.x

“…Children solved deceptive box tasks more easily than unexpected transfer tasks (in Experiment 2, but not in Experiment 1), were unaffected in the latter type of task by whether the transfer in location was accidental or intentionally deceitful (cf. Dalke, 1995), and showed skill at solving false belief tasks about another person earlier than about themselves. These findings are, at first glance, problematic, as they seemingly conflict with the findings of a recent meta‐analysis of factors influencing children's success on false belief tasks (Wellman et al , 2001).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Children's understanding of their own and others' mental states. Part B. Understanding of others precedes self‐understanding for some false beliefs

Mitchell

¹

,

Neal

²

2005

British J of Dev Psycho

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We examined 3‐ to 6‐year‐old children's understanding of their own and another's false beliefs in two experiments using diverse deceptive box and unexpected transfer tasks. Tasks in the first experiment required the child to think about an absent person's responses to questions, whereas those in the second experiment used a confederate present during testing. Children performed better on deceptive box tasks when the other person was present rather than absent; they performed equally on accidental and intentional unexpected transfer tasks. Children understood the other's false beliefs by 4–5 years of age, and their own by 5–6 years of age. Children aged between 4 and 5 years appear to have greater difficulty discounting or ignoring misleading information when thinking about their own beliefs than when thinking about another's, at least for the particular false belief tasks employed. Inconsistencies between our findings and those of a recent meta‐analysis (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) are easily reconciled.

show abstract

“…Previous findings conflict with regard to whether (1) children are likely to follow their deception with correct responses to false belief questions, and whether (2) a deceptive context actually enhances their false belief performance compared to a standard context (e.g., Brooks, Samuels, & Frye, 1998;Charman & Karpf, 1996;Dalke, 1995;Hala et al, 1991;Ruffman et al, 1993;Sodian et al, 1991;Sullivan & Winner, 1991. A second aim, then, was to illuminate these issues further by examining children's understanding of false belief in both deceptive and nondeceptive contexts.…”

Section: Studymentioning

confidence: 93%

“…We will illustrate this possibility with respect to children's deception. In recent years, deception has been examined as a potential index of early false belief understanding (e.g., Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989;Charman & Karpf, 1996;Dalke, 1995;Hala, Chandler, & Fritz, 1991;Peskin, 1992Peskin, ,1996Ruffman, Olson, Ash, & Keenan, 1993;Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991;Sodian, 1991;Sodian, Taylor, Harris, & Perner, 1991;. Full-fledged deception implicates an understanding of false belief because the very point of deception is to create a false belief in the mind of another for some ulterior purpose.…”

Section: Deception and False Beliefmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Role of Inhibitory Processes in Young Children's Difficulties with Deception and False Belief

Carlson

¹

,

Moses

²

,

Hix

³

1998

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This research examines whether children's difficulties with deception and false belief arise from a lack of inhibitory control rather than from a conceptual deficit. In 3 studies, 3-year-olds deceived frequently under conditions requiring relatively low inhibitory control (e.g., misleading pictorial cues or arrows) but failed to do so under conditions of high inhibitory control (deceptive pointing). Study 2 ruled out that the findings were due to social intimidation: Children were equally successful using an arrow to deceive under anonymous and public conditions. Study 3 indicated that, under well-controlled conditions, children did not reveal greater understanding of false belief in deceptive than nondeceptive conditions. The results of these studies suggest that children may have greater deceptive abilities than some earlier studies indicated, and that the source of their difficulty on deceptive pointing tasks lies in a failure of inhibitory control. More generally, it is argued that children's performance on false belief tasks is also likely to be affected by inhibition deficits.

show abstract

“…We will illustrate this possibility with respect to children's deception. In recent years, deception has been examined as a potential index of early false belief understanding (e.g., Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989;Charman & Karpf, 1996;Dalke, 1995;Hala, Chandler, & Fritz, 1991;Peskin, 1992Peskin, ,1996Ruffman, Olson, Ash, & Keenan, 1993;Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991;Sodian, 1991;Sodian, Taylor, Harris, & Perner, 1991;. Full-fledged deception implicates an understanding of false belief because the very point of deception is to create a false belief in the mind of another for some ulterior purpose.…”

Section: Deception and False Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Inhibitory Processes in Young Children's Difficulties with Deception and False Belief

Carlson¹,

Moses²,

Hix³

1998

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This research examines whether children's difficulties with deception and false belief arise from a lack of inhibitory control rather than from a conceptual deficit. In 3 studies, 3-year-olds deceived frequently under conditions requiring relatively low inhibitory control (e.g., misleading pictorial cues or arrows) but failed to do so under conditions of high inhibitory control (deceptive pointing). Study 2 ruled out that the findings were due to social intimidation: Children were equally successful using an arrow to deceive under anonymous and public conditions. Study 3 indicated that, under well-controlled conditions, children did not reveal greater understanding of false belief in deceptive than nondeceptive conditions. The results of these studies suggest that children may have greater deceptive abilities than some earlier studies indicated, and that the source of their difficulty on deceptive pointing tasks lies in a failure of inhibitory control. More generally, it is argued that children's performance on false belief tasks is also likely to be affected by inhibition deficits.

show abstract

Explaining young children's difficulty on the false belief task: Representational deficits or context‐sensitive knowledge?

Cited by 18 publications

References 13 publications

Children's understanding of their own and others' mental states. Part B. Understanding of others precedes self‐understanding for some false beliefs

Children's understanding of their own and others' mental states. Part B. Understanding of others precedes self‐understanding for some false beliefs

The Role of Inhibitory Processes in Young Children's Difficulties with Deception and False Belief

The Role of Inhibitory Processes in Young Children's Difficulties with Deception and False Belief

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About