Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Prescission Instead of Reification

Abstract

This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the "explanatory gap" that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel's revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block's controversial claim that we should countenance a "phenomenal-consciousness" which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reifi cation of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy developed by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness Block (rightly) calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability to prescind qualities from occurrences. RÉSUMÉ : Cet article suggère que «le fossé dans l'explication» qui tracasse la ré-fl exion sur la conscience depuis le renouveau instauré par T. Nagel est dû en grande partie à un défaut de distinctions notionnelles. En modifi ant l'affi rmation controversée de Ned Block que nous devrions accepter la présence d'une «conscience-phénoménale» ayant une existence propre, nous soutenons qu'il est possible de récupérer les intuitions qui sous-tendent cette proposition sans pour autant endosser une trop coûteuse réifi cation de la facette en question. En recouvrant la trichotomie complète en « type/token/tone » développée par C. S. Peirce, nous croyons que la spécifi cité sur laquelle Block attire (avec justesse) l'attention peut être conçue comme découlant non pas d'un quelconque module opérant furtivement dans l'esprit, mais bien de notre capacité de préscinder les qualités des occurrences. 146 Dialogue It's not hard to see how philosophers have tied themselves into such knots over qualia. They started where anyone with any sense would start: with their strongest and clearest intuitions about their own minds. Those intuitions, alas, form a mutually self-supporting closed circle of doctrines, imprisoning their imaginations in the Cartesian Theater. Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained , 1991[I]f we ask what has been the impact of semiotics upon philosophy over the course of the 20 th century, to answer anything beyond "marginal" would be an exaggeration. This situation, as I read it, is about to change dramatically. John N. Deely, "The Impact of Semiotics on Philosophy" (paper delivered at the fi rst annual homage to Oscar Parland, University of Helsinki, December 1, 2000)

Sound Reasoning (Literally): Prospects and Challenges of Current Acoustic Logics

“…Thus, in the acoustic logic envisaged by Pietarinen, "tones" would serve as the atomic elements to be related (properly or improperly, as the case may be). Tones, for Peirce, are conveyors of meaning that are even more basic than tokens or types [2]. The moment we restrict the bandwidth to a specific frequency, we render it distinct in a way that allows it to carry information, since it is now this as opposed to that.…”

A less simplistic metaphysics: Peirce’s layered theory of meaning as a layered theory of being

“…Guido Ipsen (2008: 21) is unfortunately correct when he reports that "[p]ansemiotism has […] almost become an accusation close to an insult". Th ere have been attempts to restore civility and solubility to the debates (Champagne 2009b;Champagne 2013b;Rodríguez Higuera 2015), but now this article has added an important distinction: 'pansemiotism", taken literally, is the view that reality is made of triadic signs; whereas 'trinitarianism", as I have presented it, is the view that reality is made of signs and all that such triads presuppose.…”

“…Indeed, the whole point of trinitarianism's triple commitment is that one gets lone qualities (Champagne 2015b), their contrasts with each other (Champagne 2014a), and the plethora of more or less cohesive patternslinguistic or otherwise -that ensue (Champagne 2013a). A metaphysical outlook could hardly be more inclusive.…”

“…39 I agree with Machan (1980) that, philosophically, we can discern a handful of axioms that cannot be denied on pain of being accepted. For more on what those might be, see Champagne 2006. Th e rationalist aspiration of spinning all reality out of such simple certitudes is, however, hopeless.…”

Referring to the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Iconicity instead of Indexicality

“…Acknowledgments: This article is in many ways a ‘sequel’ to Champagne 2009a. For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I would like to thank Henry Jackman, Catherine Legg, Paul Livingston, Jacob Beck, Vincent Colapietro, Andrew Parker, Brandon Fenton, Daniel Woolley, Graeme Taylor, David Jopling, Ryan Tonkens, Alberto Richards, Tom Piekarski, anonymous referees, as well as participants who discussed my work at the 2011 CPA meeting.…”