Explaining the Emergence of Entrapment in Post-9/11 Terrorism Investigations

Accounting for the (Almost Complete) Failure of the Entrapment Defense in Post-9/11 US Terrorism Cases

“…Although they note that the indicators cannot definitely prove entrapment, they argue that each indicator represents an increased chance that entrapment occurred. Versions of this database were analyzed in several additional publications (Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk 2018a, 2018b, 2019. Although it is certainly possible for a case with few indicators to represent a stronger case for entrapment than one with more indicators, a previous review was unable to identify examples (Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk 2015).…”

“…Critics, however, note that many of the defendants only agreed to commit the offense after being offered large sums of money (a tactic not used by real terrorists) or were so inept that no real terrorist would conceivably try to recruit them (Aaronson 2013). Theoretically, any radicalized individual could later become a lone-actor terrorist, but given the large number of people with radical beliefs and the small number of domestic terrorists, operations against those not already planning to engage in terrorism are extremely unlikely to prevent attacks (Norris 2015).…”

“…While there is no precise cutoff establishing when a defendant was entrapped, the highest-scoring cases are most likely to involve compelling entrapment claims, since each indicator represents an increased chance of entrapment. Previous studies used eight or more indicators as a cutoff, representing the top 23 percent of cases (Norris andGrol-Prokopczyk 2018b, 2019). Disaggregating results by number of indicators shows whether defendants with the strongest entrapment claims were more likely to go to trial, to assert entrapment, and to succeed in doing so.…”

“…In this prevalent interpretive frame, any Muslims voicing harsh critiques of US foreign policy, expressing sympathy for political violence anywhere in the world, or even increasing religious observance are perceived as being on a predictable trajectory toward personal terrorism involvement. In fact, only a miniscule percentage of people with these characteristics ever perpetrate terrorism (Norris 2015). Yet due to widespread belief in these flawed radicalization models, these factors-which have negligible value in predicting whether someone will engage in terrorism-are considered evidence allowing juries to conclude that prosecutors have proven defendants' predisposition.…”

Editor’s Introduction

“…Although none of the articles suggests that terrorism has become "a fact of the contemporary world," the first three of the articles-those by Haner, Benson and Cullen (2019), Larsen and Jensen (2019), and McCulloch, Walklate, Maher, Fitz-Gibbon and McGowan (2019)-endeavor to understand the reasons for-as well as parameters and meanings ofjihadism, terrorism and violence. The second group of three articles-those by Mulinari (2019), Norris (2019) and Kaufman and Niner (2019)-consider how states have attempted to prevent terrorism, as well as the ways in which such mechanisms and strategies have impacted the lives of citizens (most of whom are members of minority groups). The final article-by Ruggiero (2019)-contemplates the situation in Yemen which, as noted above, may prove to be the perfect setting for augmentation and bolstering of al-Qaeda forces.…”