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Background Two of the most central questions in radicalization research are, (1) why do some individuals radicalize when most of those from the same groups or exposed to similar conditions do not? and (2) why do radicalized individuals turn to radical violence while the majority remain inert? It has been suggested that the answer to both questions lie in the cumulative and interactive effects of a range of risk factors. While risk assessment and counter‐radicalization take a risk‐protective factor approach, there is widespread debate as to what these factors are and which are most important. Objectives This review has two primary objectives. 1) To identify what the putative risk and protective factors for different radicalization outcomes are, without any predeterminations. 2) To synthesize the evidence and identify the relative magnitude of the effects of different factors. The review's secondary objectives are to: 1) Identify consistencies in the estimates of factors across different radicalization outcomes. 2) Identify whether any significant heterogeneity exists within factors between (a) geographic regions, and (b) strains of radicalizing ideologies. Search Methods Over 20 databases were searched for both published and gray literature. In order to provide a more comprehensive review, supplementary searches were conducted in two German and one Dutch database. Reference harvesting was conducted from previous reviews and contact was made with leading researchers to identify and acquire missing or unpublished studies. Selection Criteria The review included observational studies assessing the outcomes of radical attitudes, intentions, and/or radical behaviors in OECD countries and which provided sufficient data to calculate effect sizes for individual‐level risk and protective factors. Data Collection and Analysis One‐hundred and twenty‐seven studies, containing 206 samples met the inclusion criteria and provided 1302 effect sizes pertaining to over 100 different factors. Random effects meta‐analyses were carried out for each factor, and meta‐regression and moderator analysis were used to explore differences across studies. Results Studies were primarily cross‐sectional, with samples representing 20 countries OECD countries. Most studies examined no specific radicalizing ideology, while others focussed on specific ideologies (e.g., Islamist, right‐wing, and left‐wing ideologies). The studies generally demonstrated low risk of bias and utilized validated or widely acceptable measures for both indicators and outcomes. With some exceptions, sociodemographic factors tend to have the smallest estimates, with larger estimates for experiential and attitudinal factors, followed by traditional criminogenic and psychological factors. Authors' Conclusions While sociodemographic factors are the most commonly examined factors (selective availability), they also tend to have the smallest estimates. So too, attitudinal and even experiential factors, do not have effect sizes of the magnitude that could lead to significa...

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Today, passengers at every major Western airport are subjected to heightened levels of security screening that not only are inconvenient, but also raise important questions about the treatment of members of specific groups that are seen as presenting special security risks. Our study examines the importance of ethnic identity in explaining perceptions of legitimacy in airport screening among a random sample of Jewish and Arab passengers in Israel. The main hypothesis of our study is that ethnicity will play a major role in predicting passengers’ attitudes toward the airport security process. In fact, our survey shows that Israeli Arab passengers are, on average, significantly more negative regarding the legitimacy of security checks than Israeli Jewish passengers are. However, using a multivariate model, we find that ethnicity (Arab versus Jew) disappears as a significant predictor of legitimacy when we included factors of procedural justice and controlled for specific characteristics of the security process. The results of our research indicate that differences in legitimacy perceptions are by and large the result of the processes used in airport screening and not a direct result of ethnic identity. In concluding, we argue that profiling strategies aimed at preventing terrorism, which often include embarrassing public procedures, may actually jeopardize passengers’ trust in airport security. Such security is dependent on the cooperation of citizens, and heightened security procedures focused on particular groups may compromise legitimacy evaluations and thus the cooperation of the public.

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