Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts

Aguiar‐Conraria, Luís; Magalhães, Pedro C.; Vanberg, Christoph

doi:10.1007/s10683-015-9473-9

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 39 publications

(38 reference statements)

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“…In their laboratory experiments, Aguiar‐Conraria et al (2016, 2019) also observe a decrease in turnout rate for a specific level of participation quorum. Their experimental design is based on Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1985) incomplete‐information game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 83%

A Referendum Experiment with Participation Quorums

Hizen¹

2020

Kyklos

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SummaryThis paper conducts a laboratory experiment focused on a yes/no referendum in which the outcome is valid only if voter turnout is greater than a predetermined level. Such a participation quorum is argued to induce the minority group of voters to abstain strategically in particular when the quorum is large. In our experiment, subjects are randomly divided into two groups yes and no in advance of voting, and the level of quorum changes round by round. We observe that (i) if the quorum is small, all subjects go to the polls, and (ii) if the quorum is large, subjects in the ex‐ante majority group go to the polls, whereas subjects in the ex‐ante minority group tend to abstain. As a result, if the quorum is large, it frequently happens that the outcome is rendered invalid because of low voter turnout. Furthermore, when the number of subjects in each referendum increases, subjects of the ex‐ante minority abstain more aggressively, and there arises room for the ex‐post minority to win if the expected number of members is similar between the two groups. Therefore, if policy makers would like to avoid the possibility of strategic abstention, then our results suggest that they should impose either no quorum or only a relatively small quorum which most voters expect will be dwarfed by the actual turnout. If policy makers also care about the possible determination of either yes or no with extremely low voter turnout, as well as strategic abstention, then a relatively small quorum is recommended.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 83%

A Referendum Experiment with Participation Quorums

Hizen¹

2020

Kyklos

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“…Diese zu überwindenden Hürden sind in den jeweiligen Landesverfassungen festgelegt und treten in Form von Beteiligungsquoren (bezogen auf den geforderten minimalen Anteil der Stimmberechtigten, die an der Abstimmung teilnehmen) und Zustimmungsquoren (bezogen auf den geforderten minimalen Unterstützungsanteil der Stimmberechtigten) auf (Meerkamp 2011: 72–74). Unstrittig ist, dass Beteiligungsquoren eine stark beteiligungsvermindernde Wirkung besitzen (Aguiar‐Conraria und Magalhães 2010a, 2010b; Aguiar‐Conraria et al 2013; Herrera und Mattozzi 2006, 2010). In der Bundesrepublik fanden jedoch fast ausschliesslich Zustimmungsquoren Anwendung.…”

Section: Hypothesenbildung Vor Dem Hintergrund Der Datenlageunclassified

“…Herrera und Mattozzi (2006) zeigen auf Basis spieltheoretischer Überlegungen, dass sich für Zustimmungs‐ und Beteiligungsquoren identische Equilibrien ergeben können. Insgesamt berichten zwei Studien negative Effekte, die von Quoren insgesamt ausgehen (Aguiar‐Conraria und Magalhães 2010b; Aguiar‐Conraria et al 2013). Es wird also vermutet, dass der Einsatz von Quoren jeglicher Art die Abstimmungsbeteiligung negativ beeinflusst:…”

Section: Hypothesenbildung Vor Dem Hintergrund Der Datenlageunclassified

Alles eine Frage von Kosten und Nutzen? Eine Aggregatdatenanalyse der Abstimmungsbeteiligung in den deutschen Bundesländern zwischen 1946 und 2019

Thomeczek

2021

Swiss Political Sci Review

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Direct democracy in Germany is primarily practiced at the state level. However, little research has analysed why participation rates vary, sometimes drastically, between individual referendums in Germany. The following article addresses this research gap with an analysis of a new aggregate dataset of participation in referendums in the federal states between 1946 and 2019. Based on the Rational Choice Theory of voting, three main factors may explain the variance in participation rates. Higher participation rates can be anticipated when the expected benefit for voters is high (state‐initiated referendums, constitutional or restructuring referendums); when the participation costs are reduced (by combining referendums with salient parallel elections); and when the result is expected to be close. The article demonstrates the analytical usefulness of the Rational Choice Approach. It can serve as a starting point for future empirical referendum participation research, which is hardly developed in Germany, especially at the individual level.

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“…A widely circulated petition for a second referendum demanded, besides a qualified majority rule, a 75% participation quorum. 3 Under such rules, the outcome of a simple majority for Leave might be regarded, at most, as provisional. However, "although with hindsight such protective and legitimizing rules might seem justified, no consideration was given to them in advance" (Whitehead 2017: 223).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What are the best quorum rules? A laboratory investigation

2019

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Many political systems with direct democracy mechanisms have adopted rules preventing decisions from being made by simple majority rule. The device most commonly added to majority rule in national is a quorum requirement. The two most common are the participation and the approval quora. Such rules are a response to three major concerns: the legitimacy of the referendum outcome, its representativeness (the concern with the outcome representing the will of the whole electorate), and protection of minorities regarding issues that should demand a broad consensus. Guided by a pivotal voter model, we conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the performance of different quora in reaching such goals. We introduce two main innovations in relation to previous work on the topic. First, part of the electorate goes to the polls out of a sense of civic duty. Second, we test the performance of a different quorum, the rejection quorum, recently proposed in the literature. We conclude that, depending on the preferred criterion, either the approval or the rejection quorum is to be preferred.

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Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts

Cited by 11 publications

References 39 publications

A Referendum Experiment with Participation Quorums

A Referendum Experiment with Participation Quorums

Alles eine Frage von Kosten und Nutzen? Eine Aggregatdatenanalyse der Abstimmungsbeteiligung in den deutschen Bundesländern zwischen 1946 und 2019

What are the best quorum rules? A laboratory investigation

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