Expense-preference behavior, agency costs, and firm organization the savings and loan industry

The effect of UK building society conversion on pricing behaviour

“…For the United States, where mutual and shareholder owned savings and loans firms co-exist, Verbrugge and Golstein (1981), Verbrugge and Jahera (1981), Akella and Greenbaum (1988), and Blair and Placone (1988) produce evidence that the mutual S&Ls appear more affected by managers' expense preferences. 9 By contrast, Murphy and Salandro (1997) find that a decline in credit quality is more pronounced among converted mutuals.…”

Regulation, deregulation and managerial behaviour: new evidence on expense preference in banking

“…Consistent with the`Chicago School' notion that concentration measures bear no systematic relation to the degree of competition in markets, several recent studies have found that local market concentration has no signi® cant impact on managerial expense preference behaviour. (Smirlock and Marshall, 1983;Blair and Placone, 1988). Other recent studies (Akella and Greenbaum, 1988) do not include any concentration variable in their regression models.…”

“…In addition to Edwards, Hannan (1979), Hannan and Mavinga (1980) and Arnould (1985) found evidence of expense preference behaviour among commercial banks, while Verbrugge and Jahera (1981) found the same for savings and loans. Others, including Mester (1989) and Blair and Placone (1988) found little or no evidence of expense preference behaviour among savings and loans, particularly with regard to testing whether ownership form (stock or mutual) led to di erences in managerial behaviour.…”

Expense preference behavior and management “outsourcing”: a comparison of adopters and non-adopters of contract management in U.S. hospitals

“…Awh and Primeaux (1985) developed a model applicable to the electric utility industry; their results provided evidence contrary to expense preference. Blair and Placone (1988) and Mester (1989) tested the hypothesis in the savings and loan industry, and found no evidence of expense preference behavior in mutuals, compared with lending institutions with shareholders who are presumed to exercise tighter control of management. However, Mester's study represented a major methodological shift from the earlier body of work, as she was critical of the notion that preferences could be revealed from an intercept term in the firm's input demand function.…”