2007
DOI: 10.1007/s11123-007-0065-3
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Expense preference behavior and management “outsourcing”: a comparison of adopters and non-adopters of contract management in U.S. hospitals

Abstract: Expense preference, Hospitals, Contract management, D24, L24,

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Cited by 7 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 36 publications
(39 reference statements)
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“…We adopt this approach to examine the relationship between different nursing staff inputs and patient satisfaction measures in hospitals. We posit a general production function of the form: Y = F ( N 1 , N 1 2 , N 1 3 , N 2 , N 2 2 , N 2 3 , D , W , K : H , S ), where Y , the “output” being produced, here, is the level of patient satisfaction; N is the vector of nursing inputs, measured in hours (e.g., N 1 = NAs, N 2 = RNs); D = physician inputs; W = all other hospital staff (a residual category); K measures the hospital’s capital stock—typically given by number of beds (Carey, 2000; Carey & Dor, 2008; Dor & Farley, 1996). All effects are conditioned on hospital characteristics ( H ), including for-profit/nonprofit status, case mix index (CMI), and teaching status and state-level characteristics ( S ) such as minimum nurse staffing laws and state fixed effects.…”
Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We adopt this approach to examine the relationship between different nursing staff inputs and patient satisfaction measures in hospitals. We posit a general production function of the form: Y = F ( N 1 , N 1 2 , N 1 3 , N 2 , N 2 2 , N 2 3 , D , W , K : H , S ), where Y , the “output” being produced, here, is the level of patient satisfaction; N is the vector of nursing inputs, measured in hours (e.g., N 1 = NAs, N 2 = RNs); D = physician inputs; W = all other hospital staff (a residual category); K measures the hospital’s capital stock—typically given by number of beds (Carey, 2000; Carey & Dor, 2008; Dor & Farley, 1996). All effects are conditioned on hospital characteristics ( H ), including for-profit/nonprofit status, case mix index (CMI), and teaching status and state-level characteristics ( S ) such as minimum nurse staffing laws and state fixed effects.…”
Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, we assume that large chain-affiliated and small chain/unaffiliated homes have different production functions for quality. This is plausible, as large chains are characterized by separation of ownership and control, which may make it more difficult to produce at a very high quality level (see Dor et al (1997) and Carey and Dor (2008) for an application of this argument to hospitals). To explore the implications of this, we consider the limiting case where large chains are unable to provide marginal quality beyond a certain threshold whereas small chains and independents are able to provide this higher quality.…”
Section: A Model Of Defensive Behavior By Large Chainsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Limited evidence concerning relative hospital performance suggests that contract management may improve hospital efficiency. 1–3 Yet, while the trade literature offers some anecdotal discussion, 4,5 there is a lack of systematic evidence on the possible mechanisms by which contract managers attempt to realize efficiency gains and at what social costs.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%