Abstract:Without an objective metric for identifying how funny humorous material “really” is, a person may rely on external information in evaluating the humor of a particular humorous joke. In two experiments, we examined the effect of expectations on participants' ratings of jokes. When participants received a message that jokes had previously been rated as either funny or unfunny, they rated the jokes accordingly. In addition, participants who were told less plausible messages about the jokes (“hysterically funny” o… Show more
“…In summary, it is argued that prior exposure to the named comedian primes an expectancy of forthcoming humor; this expectancy influences humor ratings. These findings are consistent with Wimer and Beins (2008), who showed that priming humor expectations through joke ratings can influence cognitive humor. The current study may explain why new comics need to "win over the audience" whereas established comedians can rely upon the expectation of humor derived from past exposures.…”
supporting
confidence: 91%
“…Furthermore, Wimer and Beins (2008) have shown that exposure to prior ratings of a joke can influence the subsequent appraisal of the joke. In Experiment 1 of their study, the authors presented participants with a booklet of jokes in which each joke had been described as hysterically funny, very funny, neutral, not very funny, or horribly unfunny.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…hysterically funny/horribly unfunny) did not. Wimer and Beins (2008) suggested that humor rating can be influenced by prior Brought to you by | Purdue University Libraries Authenticated Download Date | 5/30/15 5:59 AM messages but that the credulity of such messages has limitations. Socially-driven conformity to the prior rating was shown not to be the mechanism underpinning the effect of prior judgment, as manipulation of group size did not impact the effect of prior rating (Experiment 2).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Socially-driven conformity to the prior rating was shown not to be the mechanism underpinning the effect of prior judgment, as manipulation of group size did not impact the effect of prior rating (Experiment 2). It is important to note that Wimer and Beins (2008) distinguished between cognitive humor (mental evaluation of humor) and affective humor (the physical, more social, response to humor). Gavanski (1986) noted that affective responses to humor are more susceptible to change (and one might speculate intuitively on the social role of affective responses) compared to the more robust cognitive evaluations.…”
Four experiments explored the effect of humor expectancy on the cognitive evaluation of jokes. Participants read jokes purportedly delivered by celebrity comedians or celebrity non-comedians. Participants reported jokes in the comedian condition to be significantly more amusing (Experiment 1). Furthermore, this effect was repeated in a within-participants replication where celebrity comedians and celebrity non-comedians were matched on positive evaluations (Experiment 2). This indicates that the findings cannot be explained via differential positive attitudes towards the celebrities in each condition. In Experiment 3, different types of jokes (incongruency/nonsensical) and humor levels (high/low) were compared. The expectancy effect was found to be more pronounced for nonsensical jokes. This was argued to be due to nonsensical jokes being more uniquely associated with comedians, whereas the ubiquity of incongruency jokes dilutes any effect of expectancy. However, Experiment 4 demonstrated that the expectancy effect is contingent on the name of the comedian being observed. In summary, it is argued that prior exposure to the named comedian primes an expectancy of forthcoming humor; this expectancy influences humor ratings. These findings are consistent with Wimer and Beins (2008), who showed that priming humor expectations through joke ratings can influence cognitive humor. The current study may explain why new comics need to "win over the audience" whereas established comedians can rely upon the expectation of humor derived from past exposures.
“…In summary, it is argued that prior exposure to the named comedian primes an expectancy of forthcoming humor; this expectancy influences humor ratings. These findings are consistent with Wimer and Beins (2008), who showed that priming humor expectations through joke ratings can influence cognitive humor. The current study may explain why new comics need to "win over the audience" whereas established comedians can rely upon the expectation of humor derived from past exposures.…”
supporting
confidence: 91%
“…Furthermore, Wimer and Beins (2008) have shown that exposure to prior ratings of a joke can influence the subsequent appraisal of the joke. In Experiment 1 of their study, the authors presented participants with a booklet of jokes in which each joke had been described as hysterically funny, very funny, neutral, not very funny, or horribly unfunny.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…hysterically funny/horribly unfunny) did not. Wimer and Beins (2008) suggested that humor rating can be influenced by prior Brought to you by | Purdue University Libraries Authenticated Download Date | 5/30/15 5:59 AM messages but that the credulity of such messages has limitations. Socially-driven conformity to the prior rating was shown not to be the mechanism underpinning the effect of prior judgment, as manipulation of group size did not impact the effect of prior rating (Experiment 2).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Socially-driven conformity to the prior rating was shown not to be the mechanism underpinning the effect of prior judgment, as manipulation of group size did not impact the effect of prior rating (Experiment 2). It is important to note that Wimer and Beins (2008) distinguished between cognitive humor (mental evaluation of humor) and affective humor (the physical, more social, response to humor). Gavanski (1986) noted that affective responses to humor are more susceptible to change (and one might speculate intuitively on the social role of affective responses) compared to the more robust cognitive evaluations.…”
Four experiments explored the effect of humor expectancy on the cognitive evaluation of jokes. Participants read jokes purportedly delivered by celebrity comedians or celebrity non-comedians. Participants reported jokes in the comedian condition to be significantly more amusing (Experiment 1). Furthermore, this effect was repeated in a within-participants replication where celebrity comedians and celebrity non-comedians were matched on positive evaluations (Experiment 2). This indicates that the findings cannot be explained via differential positive attitudes towards the celebrities in each condition. In Experiment 3, different types of jokes (incongruency/nonsensical) and humor levels (high/low) were compared. The expectancy effect was found to be more pronounced for nonsensical jokes. This was argued to be due to nonsensical jokes being more uniquely associated with comedians, whereas the ubiquity of incongruency jokes dilutes any effect of expectancy. However, Experiment 4 demonstrated that the expectancy effect is contingent on the name of the comedian being observed. In summary, it is argued that prior exposure to the named comedian primes an expectancy of forthcoming humor; this expectancy influences humor ratings. These findings are consistent with Wimer and Beins (2008), who showed that priming humor expectations through joke ratings can influence cognitive humor. The current study may explain why new comics need to "win over the audience" whereas established comedians can rely upon the expectation of humor derived from past exposures.
“…For example, the frequency and duration of smiling and laughter in response to humorous stimuli is impacted by the presence of a laughing versus a nonlaughing model person. Further factors, such as the responsiveness of the companion, the seating position, and proximity to the companion, as well as eye contact, age difference between the companion and the subject, whether groups of strangers or friends are together, and the group size have been investigated and shown to be influential (i.e., leading to more overt amusement responses; e.g., Devereux and Ginsburg 2001;Levy and Fenley 1979;Wimer and Beins 2008). Furthermore, the current mood influences the effects of the increased amusement due to the presence of a companion: Only high state cheerful individuals smiled more by the mere presence of another person, but this was not so for individuals that were not in a cheerful mood (e.g., Deckers 2007).…”
We investigated the role of a virtual companion and trait cheerfulness on the elicitation of amusement. Ninety participants watched funny films in four conditions: either alone, with a virtual companion laughing or verbally expressing amusement at fixed time points (pre-scripted), or additionally joining the participant's laughter (responsive companion). Amusement was assessed facially and vocally by coding Duchenne Displays and laughter vocalizations. Participants' cheerful mood pre and post the film watching and positive experience were assessed. Results showed that high trait cheerful individuals generally experienced and expressed more amusement than low trait cheerful individuals. The presence of a virtual companion (compared to being alone) led to more laughter for individuals low in trait cheerfulness. Unexpectedly, the responsive companion did not elicit more amusement than the pre-scripted companion. The general disliking of virtual companions and gelotophobia related negatively to amusement. Amusement expressing virtual companions may be used in interventions aiming at eliciting positive responses, especially for individuals with higher thresholds for amusement.
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