Executive veto, legislative override, and structure-induced equilibrium

Abstract

In this study the structure-induced equilibrium approach for modeling democratic institutions is extended to allow for the added structural features of executive veto and legislative override. A multidimensional model is presented for a budgetary process involving three actors -a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive. In order to focus attention on the role of the veto and override possibilities, simplifying assumptions are made with regard to other aspects of the agenda formation process. In particular, the committee has monopoly agenda power, a closed amendment control rule is operative, and perfect-foresight expectations are held by the committee and the executive. Given these assumptions, utility maximization by the several actors generates a budget outcome characterized as a structure-induced equilibrium. The general model is illustrated geometrically with a two-dimensional example, permitting budget outcomes to be analyzed for various combinations of veto rules and override provisions. The analysis demonstrates that budget outcomes are sensitive to alternative specifications of veto rules and override provisions. In the illustration, executive veto power is shown to vary directly with both the permissiveness of the veto rule and the stringency of the override provision. Similar relationships, however, are not found to exist for total budget expenditures.

Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics

“…In turn, the model implies that fewer inefficient projects would pass, leading to lowered government spending in the second term relative to the first. 2 However, even when the president desires lower budgets than Congress, Carter and Schap (1987) and Dearden and Husted (1990) demonstrate theoretically that line item vetoes do not necessarily lower expenditure below that associated with an all or nothing veto. This may explain weak and negative empirical results about the effect of line item vetoes in reducing expenditure in the states (Alm and Evers 1991;Holtz-Eakin 1988).…”

Logik kollektiver Entscheidungen

“…7.1 folgt im wesentlichen Enelow & Hinich (1984) Carter & Schap (1987), Greenberg& Shepsle (1987), Grofman, Owen, Noviello & Glazer (1987) sowie Shepsle (1985Shepsle ( , 1986 und Shepsle & Weingast (1984vgl. auch Tullock (1981) und Koford (1982.…”

Line-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?

“…See Carter and Schap (1987); Dearden and Husted (forthcoming); Kiewiet and McCubbins (1986); Mackay and Weaver (1985); Matthews (1989); Schap (1986Schap ( , 1988; and Shepsle and Weingast (1981). Rather than build directly on this literature we choose here to build alongside of it.…”