Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights

Smith, Henry E.

doi:10.1086/344529

Cited by 118 publications

(66 citation statements)

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“…16 See mainly North and Thomas (1973);North (1981North ( , 1990and North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009). 17 This perspective has illuminated a variety of issues, including, among many others: the forces behind the emergence and precision of private property rights, such as increases in the value of resources (Demsetz, 1967;Libecap, 1978;Smith, 2002), the costs of exclusion (Anderson and Hill, 1975) and the costs of measuring different resource attributes (Barzel, 1997); the political forces behind alternative outcomes from common pool problems (Libecap, 1989); informal regimes of common property (Ostrom, 1990); specific situations, such as homesteading (Anderson and Hill, 1990;Allen, 1991) and frontiers (Alston, Libecap and Mueller, 1999); particular contractual arrangements, such as sharecropping (Cheung, 1969;Allen and Lueck, 2003); and a variety of institutional solutions, from first possession (Lueck, 1995) to restrictions on alienability (Epstein, 1985;Rose-Ackerman, 1985;Barzel, 1997). Lueck and Miceli (2007) provide a comprehensive survey.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Property as an economic concept: reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Arruñada

2012

Int Rev Econ

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Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rights disregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide to rightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers in terms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstate the role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, the essential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and, second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable of making truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactions on the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting both elements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of both property and corporate contracting.

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confidence: 99%

Property as an economic concept: reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Arruñada

2012

Int Rev Econ

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“…In general, an enforcement approach is considered to be more precise if it more specifically differentiates legitimate users and uses from illegitimate ones [19]. The cost of this depends on some attributes of the system itself.…”

Section: Conclusion and Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enforcement and Spectrum Sharing: Case Studies of Federal-Commercial Sharing

2013

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“…joint ventures in business. From the starting point of the semicommons, Smith soon progressed to a more general theory of resource management, dividing the entire territory into two types of strategies, which he called "exclusion" and "governance," corresponding, very roughly speaking, to individual and group management (Smith 2002).…”

Section: Gc and Legal Property Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Ostrom and the lawyers: The impact of Governing the Commons on the American legal academy

Rose

2011

Int J Commons

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American legal academics began to cite Elinor Ostrom's Governing the Commons (GC) shortly after its 1990 publication, with citations peaking in the mid-2000s and with signs of a new peak in 2010 in the wake of Ostrom's Nobel Prize in Economics. The legal scholars most interested in GC have worked in three areas: general property theory, environmental and natural resource law, and since the mid-1990s, intellectual property. In all those areas legal scholars have found GC and its many examples a strong source of support for the proposition that people can cooperate to overcome common pool resource issues, managing resources through informal norms rather than either individual property or coercive government. Legal academics have also been at least mildly critical of GC, however. A number have tried to balance the attractive features of GC's governance model -stability and sustainability -with more standard legal models favoring toward open markets, fluid change and egalitarianism.

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Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights

Cited by 118 publications

References 1 publication

Property as an economic concept: reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Property as an economic concept: reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Enforcement and Spectrum Sharing: Case Studies of Federal-Commercial Sharing

Ostrom and the lawyers: The impact of Governing the Commons on the American legal academy

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