Exclusion in Digital Markets

Stylianou, Konstantinos

doi:10.36645/mtlr.24.2.exclusion

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…22 These considerations hold particularly true for digital markets due to the interconnectedness among digital products and services, which cut across what may traditionally be seen as distinct markets. 23 Blockchain markets are likely to be susceptible to such effects, as they are beginning to exhibit the kind of malleability and interconnectedness that makes digital markets easier to construe as ecosystems rather than as traditional vertical value chains. 24 By means of an example, exchanges, which serve as wallets, transaction platforms and issue their own cryptoassets, seem to be in the early stages of developing an ecosystem around them, as they architect the type of transactions that are available on their platforms and also expand themselves into different markets that can otherwise be seen as distinct (e.g.…”

Section: The Function and Complications Of Market Share Calculationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Size of the Crypto Economy: Calculating Market Shares of Cryptoassets, Exchanges and Mining Pools

Stylianou¹,

Carter²

2020

Journal of Competition Law &Amp; Economics

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Cryptoassets and related actors such as crypto exchanges and mining pools are now fully integrated into mainstream economic activity. A necessary corollary is that they have attracted heightened regulatory and investor scrutiny. Although some rules and obligations apply uniformly across all economic actors in a given sector, many others, such as antitrust laws and some financial regulations as well as investor decisions are informed by actors’ relative economic size—meaning that those with larger market shares can become more attractive regulatory or investing targets. It is therefore a foundational issue to properly measure the economic footprint of economic actors in the crypto economy, for otherwise regulatory oversight and investor decisions risk being misled. This has proven a remarkably difficult exercise for multiple reasons including unfamiliarity with the underlying technology and role of involved actors, lack of understanding of the applicable metrics’ economic significance, and the unreliability of self-reported statistics, partly enabled by lack of regulation. Acknowledging the centrality of cryptoasset size in a number of regulatory and policymaking areas and the fact that previous attempts have been incomplete, simplistic, or even plainly wrong, this paper presents the first systematic examination of the economic footprint of cryptoassets and their constituent actors—mining pools and crypto exchanges. We aim to achieve a number of objectives: to introduce, identify, and organize all relevant and meaningful metrics of crypto economic actors market share calculation; to develop associations between metrics, and to explain their meaning, application, and limitations so that it becomes obvious in which context metrics can be useful or not, and what the potential caveats are; and to present rich, curated, and vetted data to illustrate metrics and their use in measuring the shares of crypto economic actors in their respective markets. The result is a comprehensive guidance into the size of the crypto economy.

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Section: The Function and Complications Of Market Share Calculationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Size of the Crypto Economy: Calculating Market Shares of Cryptoassets, Exchanges and Mining Pools

Stylianou¹,

Carter²

2020

Journal of Competition Law &Amp; Economics

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“…188 From a legal point of view, it is also important to determine the weight that is attached to equality in comparison to other competing considerations. 189 Formal equality can be distinguished from material equality, which relates to achieving equality of outcomes and requires addressing differences in resources and opportunities. Material equality, also known as substantive equality, is closely tied to distributive justice principles, which for the purposes of this research play only a marginal role.…”

Section: Equalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…188 Since the facts of the case concern an investigation opened more than a decade ago, technological developments are expected to create new ways to foreclose competitors by self-favouring in digital markets. 189 Hypernudging by VAs provides a powerful depiction of an advanced way to engage in self-preferencing practices that could be considered by competition authorities.…”

Section: Voice-based Services Vis-à-vis the Future Of Self-preferencingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent legislative initiatives set-off by the European Democracy Action Plan reflect the goals of strengthening European democratic ideals in the digital domain. 189 Online political advertising, which encompasses political microtargeting, received significant attention from the policymakers. The (proposed) solutions predominantly focus on increasing transparency of political advertising processes to, in turn, increase accountability of digital platforms.…”

Section: Political Microtargeting: a Multifaceted Legal Response To A...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Taming Digital Influence: Hypernudging and the Role for European Competition Law

Morozovaitė

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This dissertation examines hypernudging – a sophisticated form of user influencing online - within the context of big technology companies and their prominent role in shaping digital markets. Digital platforms are increasingly adopting user influencing practices to encourage engagement and spending, sometimes to the detriment of the users. This research takes the form of a legal and normative assessment of the role that European competition law should play in addressing the challenges posed by hypernudging by big technology companies. The thesis unfolds through three interrelated themes. Firstly, it defines hypernudging in its multiple aspects by establishing a consolidated framework and situating these practices within the transdisciplinary debate on user influencing, underscoring the risks of individual and collective harm. Secondly, the study examines hypernudging in the context of the abuse of dominance prohibition under European competition law. Using case studies in the ad tech and voice assistant markets, it shows that hypernudging can facilitate exclusionary self-preferencing behavior by powerful firms. Furthermore, a case study on political microtargeting takes a normative perspective to question the boundaries of European competition law. It underlines the need for balancing between efficiency and democratic considerations, particularly as big technology companies extend their influence into the political sphere. Finally, hypernudging is situated within the EU's digital policy agenda, highlighting the complexities policymakers face in regulating digital markets. While existing competition law theories can be applied to hypernudging, a normative stance advocates for an expanded role that facilitates the co-creation of digital markets in line with EU values.

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Os Incentivos Fiscais da Sudene Melhoram os Indicadores de Desenvolvimento? Evidências do Norte do Espírito Santo

Leal¹,

Neto²,

Felipe³

2022

Blucher Engineering Proceedings

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Exclusion in Digital Markets

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

The Size of the Crypto Economy: Calculating Market Shares of Cryptoassets, Exchanges and Mining Pools

The Size of the Crypto Economy: Calculating Market Shares of Cryptoassets, Exchanges and Mining Pools

Taming Digital Influence: Hypernudging and the Role for European Competition Law

Os Incentivos Fiscais da Sudene Melhoram os Indicadores de Desenvolvimento? Evidências do Norte do Espírito Santo

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