Examining Parties as Procedural Cartels: Evidence from the <scp>U</scp>.<scp>S</scp>. States

Clark, Jennifer Hayes

doi:10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00059.x

Cited by 14 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…At the federal level, scholars have studied how institutional assets such as committee assignments, majority-party status, and leadership positions affect the allocation of campaign contributions (Ansolabehere and Snyder 1999;Ban, Moskowitz, and Snyder 2016;Berry and Fowler 2016;Cox and Magar 1999;Powell and Grimmer 2016); however, limited turnover among legislative leaders at the federal level makes it difficult, if not impossible, to test nuanced claims concerning agenda setting and the allocation of campaign contributions. At the state level, scholars have explored the institutional rules and procedures affecting legislative committees and leaders (Aldrich and Battista 2002;Clark 2012;Clucas 2001;Hamm, Hedlund, and Martorano 2006;Hedlund et al 2009;Hedlund and Hamm 1996), and in a separate line of literature, scholars have studied the role of money in state legislative elections (Barber 2016;Fouirnaies and Hall 2014); however, data limitations have prevented comprehensive studies of agenda control and the allocation of campaign finance to individual state legislators. This article provides an important missing link between the literature on agenda setting and the literature on campaign finance.…”

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confidence: 99%

When Are Agenda Setters Valuable?

Fouirnaies

2017

American J Political Sci

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Why do industries donate money to legislative campaigns when roll-call votes suggest that donors gain nothing in return? I argue that corporate donors may shape policy outcomes by influencing powerful agenda setters in the early stages of lawmaking. On the basis of a new data set of more than 45,000 individual state legislator sessions , I document how agenda control is deemed valuable to legislators and groups seeking influence on policy. Employing a difference-in-differences design, I assess the revealed price, as measured by campaign contributions, that firms are willing to pay for access to committee and party leaders and document how this price varies across industries and institutions. The results indicate that industries systematically funnel money to the legislative agenda setters by whom they are regulated, and to those endowed with important procedural powers. I document that the value of agenda-setter positions has increased dramatically in recent years. Finally, exploiting changes in state laws, I show that relaxing contribution limits significantly benefits committee chairs and party leaders more so than it does other legislators, suggesting that agenda setters have strong incentives to obstruct restrictive campaign finance reforms.

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confidence: 99%

When Are Agenda Setters Valuable?

Fouirnaies

2017

American J Political Sci

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“…Existing research indicates the majority party of a legislature controls the process by producing unified voting blocks and by manipulating procedures and rules to control what reaches and what does not reach the formal agenda (Battista and Richman 2011;Clark 2012;Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins 2010). Kousser (2002, 668) suggests "that state policymakers are not neutral," and partisanship plays a strong role in policy outcomes.…”

Section: Party Control Of Legislaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Reconsidering State Variation in Incarceration Rates

et al. 2020

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State incarceration rates have been a topic of much policy discussion. One notable issue missing from much of the literature concerns the various determinants that account for state differences in incarceration rates. Why are some states more or less likely to incarcerate their citizenry than other states? The article examines the 50 states in a cross-sectional state comparative model. Using a dependent variable of state incarceration rates, we offer and test several explanatory models, including socioeconomic factors, political explanations, social control mechanisms, and structural factors. We find that socioeconomic explanations to be the most robust, but we find varying degrees of support for each of our four models.

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“…Roll‐call behavior may not be a reflection of their ideology or support for the party's agenda. It may be in the party's interest to allow members to vote differently from the party on roll calls where their votes are not needed and those members face electoral incentives to vote against the majority of the party (Clark ). To the extent this occurs, it diminishes the likelihood of a relationship between members’ roll‐call votes and caucus attendance.…”

Section: Which Members Are More Likely To Attend?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Benefits from the Party Organization? Evidence from Republican House Members' Attendance at Caucus Meetings

Dynes

Reeves

2017

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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As the role of US congressional parties in the legislative process has increased, so has the importance of understanding the institutions within these organizations. In this article, we examine the weekly caucus meetings held by Republican House leaders with their rank‐and‐file. We consider how members’ characteristics relate to their decision to attend based on the collective and private benefits that caucus participation affords. Using interviews of members and staffers as well as members’ attendance records at these meetings from 2007 to 2013, we find, among other things, that members who vote less with their party or who have more seniority are less likely to attend while those in leadership positions or who are electorally vulnerable are more likely to do so. Together, these findings provide additional insights on the relationship between party leaders and their members and which members benefit from this central party‐building activity.

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Examining Parties as Procedural Cartels: Evidence from the U.S. States

Cited by 14 publications

References 44 publications

When Are Agenda Setters Valuable?

When Are Agenda Setters Valuable?

Reconsidering State Variation in Incarceration Rates

Who Benefits from the Party Organization? Evidence from Republican House Members' Attendance at Caucus Meetings

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