Evolving the Psychological Mechanisms for Cooperation

Abstract

Cooperation is common across nonhuman animal taxa, from the hunting of large game in lions to the harvesting of building materials in ants. Theorists have proposed a number of models to explain the evolution of cooperative behavior. These ultimate explanations, however, rarely consider the proximate constraints on the implementation of cooperative behavior. Here we review several types of cooperation and propose a suite of cognitive abilities required for each type to evolve. We propose that several types of cooperation, though theoretically possible and functionally adaptive, have not evolved in some animal species because of cognitive constraints. We argue, therefore, that future modeling efforts and experimental investigations into the adaptive function of cooperation in animals must be grounded in a realistic assessment of the psychological ingredients required for cooperation. Such an approach can account for the puzzling distribution of cooperative behaviors across taxa, especially the seemingly unique occurrence of cooperation observed in our own species.

Group size, grooming and fission in primates: A modeling approach based on group structure

“…Grooming a specific and low number of partners could also be of interest when managing time (individuals do not need to change their grooming time when group size increases) but could also have implications when considering cognitive capacities. Several authors (Dunbar 1992a(Dunbar , 1996Lehmann et al, 2007;Stevens et al, 2005) have suggested that there is a relationship between the cognitive capacities (measured as the neocortex ratio) and the number of relationships an individual can keep track of. Remembering the grooming relationships for 5 partners would be the easiest solution for an individual, and would be a more parsimonious pro cess than having to remember its ties with all group members.…”

Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans

“…Punishment is not the only way to enforce cooperation; harassing those having access to a resource [67], chasing shirkers [68] or sabotaging the attempts of cheaters [16], are different examples, and can also be found in other animals, such as mammals, fishes or insects. But humans, with their cognitive capacities for individual recognition, temporal discounting, memory, empathy and language, are uniquely gifted to develop the proximal mechanisms needed for reciprocation and in particular for punishment.…”

Do cleaner fish learn to feed against their preference in a reverse reward contingency task?

“…The evolution and maintenance of cooperative behaviour is likely constrained by the cognitive abilities in the species concerned (Stevens and Hauser 2004;Stevens et al 2005). This is particularly important in case individuals interact in reciprocal interactions, where the act of cooperating reduces the immediate payoVs for the actor and is hence an investment that often only yields beneWts in the future (Bergmüller et al 2007a, b;Bshary and Bergmüller 2008).…”

“…Impulse control may be advantageous in order to withhold an action that would have deleterious consequences in the future. Individuals may proWt from impulse control behaviour by avoiding unbeneWcial temporal discounting (Stevens and Hauser 2004;Abeyesinghe et al 2005;Stevens et al 2005;Wittmann and Paulus 2008) or when feeding against a preference (Genty and Roeder 2006;Wittmann and Paulus 2008). The ability to control impulsive behaviour should be particularly important in cooperative interactions, i.e.…”

“…The ability to control impulsive behaviour should be particularly important in cooperative interactions, i.e. when investments in others yield a net gain in the future compared to not investing (Stevens et al 2005;Bergmüller et al 2007a;West et al 2007;Bshary and Bergmüller 2008).…”