Evolutionary Safety Analysis: Motivations from the Air Traffic Management Domain

Abstract

Abstract. In order realistically and cost-effectively to realize the ATM (Air Traffic Management) 2000+ Strategy, systems from different suppliers will be interconnected to form a complete functional and operational environment, covering ground segments and aerospace. Industry will be involved as early as possible in the lifecycle of ATM projects. EURO-CONTROL manages the processes that involve the definition and validation of new ATM solutions using Industry capabilities (e.g., SMEs). In practice, safety analyses adapt and reuse system design models (produced by third parties). Technical, organisational and cost-related reasons often determine this choice, although design models are unfit for safety analysis. Design models provide limited support to safety analysis, because they are tailored for system designers. The definition of an adequate model and of an underlying methodology for its construction will be highly beneficial for whom is performing safety analyses. Limited budgets and resources, often, constrain or inhibit the model definition phase as an integral part of safety analysis. This paper is concerned with problems in modeling ATM systems for safety analysis. The main objective is to highlight a model specifically targeted to support evolutionary safety analysis.

Modeling Safety Case Evolution – Examples from the Air Traffic Management Domain

“…identified in Controller Reports [1] and TCAS II Incidents [2] highlight the complexity and the coupling within the ATM domain [34]. The analysis [15] of the reports is in agreement with other studies [39,43] that analyse human errors as organisational failures [20,28,37].…”

“…Evolutionary Safety Analysis [15] relies on a logical framework that captures cycles of discoveries and exploitations. The underlying idea involves the identification of mappings between socio-technical solutions and problems.…”

“…The underlying idea involves the identification of mappings between socio-technical solutions and problems. The proposed framework [15] exploits these mappings in order to construct an evolutionary model that enhances safety analysis. This section briefly recalls the proposed framework for evolutionary safety analysis.…”

Trust Strategies and Policies in Complex Socio-technical Safety-Critical Domains: An Analysis of the Air Traffic Management Domain

“…Unfortunately, ATM systems and procedures have distinct characteristics (e.g., openness, volatility, etc.) that expose limitations of the approach [17,18,20,19]. ATM systems operate in open and dynamic environments where it is difficult completely to identify system interactions (e.g., between aircraft systems and ATM safety relevant systems) [17,18,20,19].…”

“…Hence, safety analysis has to take into account these complex interaction mechanisms (e.g., failure dependence, reliance in ATM, etc.) in order to guarantee and, possibly, increase the overall ATM safety as envisaged by the ATM 2000+ Strategy [17,18,20,19].…”