2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2018.02.041
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Evolutionary investors’ power-based game on networks

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Cited by 16 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Bakker et al [29] and Stefan et al [30] established an evolution model of investors' investment behavior based on the investor's social network to analyze investor behavior and its impact on the stock market. Xu et al [31] proposed a weighted game model in investor network and found that the investor behavior evolution in WS small-world network is more stable than that in BA scale-free network. Khashanah and Alsulaiman [32] analyzed the performance of their investment behavior on the scale-free network by taking four types of investors, basic strategy traders, momentum traders, adaptive strategy traders, and zero-intelligence traders, into consideration.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bakker et al [29] and Stefan et al [30] established an evolution model of investors' investment behavior based on the investor's social network to analyze investor behavior and its impact on the stock market. Xu et al [31] proposed a weighted game model in investor network and found that the investor behavior evolution in WS small-world network is more stable than that in BA scale-free network. Khashanah and Alsulaiman [32] analyzed the performance of their investment behavior on the scale-free network by taking four types of investors, basic strategy traders, momentum traders, adaptive strategy traders, and zero-intelligence traders, into consideration.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Evolutionary game dynamics combines game theory and nonlinear dynamics to describe the evolution of the frequencies of strategies in one or more large population [1,2]. It has edged into many elds such as networks population [3][4][5][6], economics [7,8], biology [9,10], management [11,12], and cooperative behaviors [13][14][15][16]. ere are many important evolutionary game dynamics such as replicator dynamics, imitative dynamics [17], best-response dynamics [18], and so on [19].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%