Evolutionary Game Theory

Cressman, Ross; Apaloo, Joseph

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-27335-8_6-1

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 105 publications

(204 reference statements)

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“…In the second stage, biologists introduced evolution into traditional game theory, transformed Nash equilibrium into evolutionary stabilization strategy, and constructed a replication dynamic model [46,47]. In the third stage, economists use biologists' ideas to develop evolutionary stable equilibrium to stochastic stable equilibrium and deterministic complex dynamic model to stochastic individual learning dynamic model [48][49][50][51][52][53].…”

Section: Theory Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multilevel Governments’ Decision-Making Process and Its Influencing Factors in Watershed Ecological Compensation

Gao

Shen

et al. 2019

Sustainability

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Transboundary water pollution is a long-standing problem in China, although the Chinese government has been committed to the protection of water resources. Due to the different interests of multilevel governments and the regionalization of management, there is still no unified plan to solve the transboundary water pollution in China. Watershed ecological compensation as a holistic plan to deal with transboundary water pollution is being promoted currently. Taking the South-to-North Water Transfer Project' eastern route as an example, this paper firstly analyses stakeholders' strategies and establishes a tripartite game model based on evolutionary game theory. Secondly, by introducing Cobb Douglas production function creatively, the supervision level of the central government is refined into supervisory attitude and supervisory skills. Thirdly, the numerical simulation is used to analyze the sensitivity of influencing factors. The results show that: (1) whether the central government supervises the local governments mainly depends on the benefits of water environment improvement and supervision costs; (2) the initial negotiation plan of the stakeholders has a significant impact on their optimum strategies; (3) the fines imposed by the central government on the local governments have a small impact on the stable state of the system; (4) the higher the eco-compensation fee, the lower their likelihood of cooperation; (5) the central government's supervisory attitude and supervisory skills have significant effect on the sustainability of the optimum arrangement, even when willingness of upstream and downstream governments to cooperate is low; (6) the initial ecological benefits of downstream governments have no effect on the optimum strategy. Therefore, considering these insights is helpful to improve the watershed ecological compensation mechanism in order to solve transboundary water pollution and achieve the sustainability of water resources.

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Section: Theory Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The evolutionary game differs from traditional game theory in that it studies the evolutionary process of group size and strategy frequency. The evolutionary process mainly includes a selection mechanism and the mutation mechanism [53]. (4) Evolutionary stabilization strategy.…”

Section: Theory Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multilevel Governments’ Decision-Making Process and Its Influencing Factors in Watershed Ecological Compensation

Gao

Shen

et al. 2019

Sustainability

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“…This approach is more realistic and can be used to study the dynamic change laws of participants' choice strategies while maintaining the dynamics and forming a macro model with micro foundations. It focuses on the group dynamics presented by the strategy adjustment process at the micro-individual and macro level [11,[14][15][16], which can more accurately reflect the diversity and complexity of group behaviour and provide an effective research framework for collaborative interactions between multiple agents [17,18].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis of behaviour strategy for UAV swarm in communication‐constrained environments

Hu,

Ru,

et al. 2023

IET Control Theory & Appl

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In the process of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) cluster coordination, communication obstruction may cause situational misjudgement and increase the risk of decision‐making errors. Therefore, based on evolutionary game theory, this research aimed to study the behaviour decision‐making selection problem in the process of UAV swarm missions in limited communication networks. First, the evolution process of the UAV swarm confrontation game is analyzed and the decision‐making risks associated with the communication network of the UAV swarm during coordination, which are caused by the complex confrontation environment are identified. Second, the decision‐making risks and mechanisms of UAV swarm communication is discussed and an evolutionary game mathematical model for the cooperative strategy of a UAV swarm under communication constraints is established. Finally, the influence of various key parameters is simulated and analyzed, such as the initial strategy probability of both parties, amount of platform information data, information analysis and utilization ability, and information interaction coefficient, on the evolution of the UAV swarm strategy. This research provides a theoretical basis and feasible reference for the improvement of UAV mission decision response mechanisms and system model construction, which have important theoretical value and practical significance.

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“…Evolutionary game theory originated from the theory of biological evolution and grew from the theory of behavioural ecology. It is a theory that combines game analysis (Barichard & Stéphan, 2017;Koriche, Lagrue, Piette, & Tabary, 2017;Sigmund & Nowak, 2001). Through the survival of the fittest, the behaviour of game participants will tend to certain stable strategy (ESS).…”

Section: Evolutionary Game Model Of University Knowledge Transfer Based On Innovation Intermediarymentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on University Knowledge Transfer Strategy Selection based on Innovation Intermediary

2018

EDUC SCI-THEOR PRACT

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In the era of knowledge economy, knowledge producers play an important role in economic development. How to promote knowledge transfer and commercialization of knowledge achievements has become an urgent problem for many universities which are major knowledge producers. This paper analyzes the behavior characteristics and interest relationship of innovation intermediaries and universities in knowledge transfer cooperation, constructs the evolutionary game model of innovation intermediaries and universities in knowledge transfer cooperation, analyzes the strategy choice, evolution track and influence factors of the two. On this basis, the paper puts forward some strategic suggestions to promote the transfer of university knowledge.

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Evolutionary Game Theory

Cited by 7 publications

References 105 publications

Multilevel Governments’ Decision-Making Process and Its Influencing Factors in Watershed Ecological Compensation

Multilevel Governments’ Decision-Making Process and Its Influencing Factors in Watershed Ecological Compensation

Evolutionary game analysis of behaviour strategy for UAV swarm in communication‐constrained environments

Research on University Knowledge Transfer Strategy Selection based on Innovation Intermediary

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