Evolutionary game of the green investment in a two-echelon supply chain under a government subsidy mechanism

Sun, Hua; Wan, Yao; Zhang, Linlin; Zhou, Zhen

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.06.329

Cited by 160 publications

(83 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…The government interferes with market operation through tax, loan, and capital control measures, which in turn affect the efficiency of resource allocation and the level of economic development. On the one hand, government support may make up for the lack of markets, provide support for advantageous industries, promote regional technological innovation capabilities and industrial upgrading, and thereby increase carbon productivity [43]. On the other hand, government support may also disrupt the market order, cause vicious competition, and reduce the efficiency of resource allocation, which is not conducive to regional sustainable development.…”

Section: Variable Description and Data Processingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Application of Threshold Regression Analysis to Study the Impact of Clean Energy Development on China’s Carbon Productivity

Han

Feng

et al. 2020

IJERPH

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Facing the pressures of international carbon emission reduction, the transformation into a low-carbon economy has become a common issue of all countries. The core of developing a low-carbon economy is to increase carbon productivity, which can be measured as the economic benefits of unit carbon emissions. Therefore, using province-level panel data in China from 2009 to 2017, we analyze the carbon productivity level of each region, and empirically investigate the threshold effect of clean energy development on carbon productivity under different technological innovation levels. The results show that the carbon productivity is rising, and China’s economic development pattern has been shifting towards low-carbon and sustainable development. Furthermore, the driving force of clean energy development on carbon productivity is not monotonously increasing (decreasing) but is a “double threshold effect” of technological innovation capability. Finally, based on the research conclusions and realistic requirements of China’s low-carbon economic transformation, this paper proposes improving carbon productivity from the aspects of innovation capability improvement and institutional guarantee.

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Section: Variable Description and Data Processingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Application of Threshold Regression Analysis to Study the Impact of Clean Energy Development on China’s Carbon Productivity

Han

Feng

et al. 2020

IJERPH

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“…Liu et al put forward a three-stage stackelberg game model and use this model for retail-led supply under government subsidies Decision analysis of the problem [23]. Sun also obtained Green Investment Strategy, based on two supply chain manufacturers and material suppliers.In order to determine the optimal decision-making under the government subsidies [25]. In addition, some scholars research subsidy strategies from the perspective of social welfare.…”

Section: Related Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Government Subsidy Strategies for Biosimilars R&D Based on Dynamic Game Theory

2020

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In order to develop the biomedical industry, government subsidy of biosimilars is an incentive policy which has been used by the government. Different government subsidy strategies have an impact on drug price, consumer surplus, social welfare, the income of biosimilars enterprises and the demand of biosimilars, which have been deeply analyzed through backward induction of the dynamic game theory. The analysis shows that the price coefficient and the influence of the subsidy on demand will affect the choice of government subsidy strategies. It is concluded that under different subsidy strategies, consumer surplus, social welfare and the income of biosimilars enterprises are positively correlated with the amount of subsidy per unit product. This paper provides a decision-making basis for developing government subsidy strategies scientifically.

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“…Sun et al established an evolutionary game model of green investment decision-making of supplier and manufacturer groups under the background that both supplier and manufacturer's green investment can be subsidized by government. It is concluded that setting government subsidies in a certain range can reduce the free-riding behavior of green investment in the two groups [27]. Liu et al analyzed the game behavior of government and manufacturer by establishing an evolutionary game model [28].…”

Section: Government Subsidies Based On Technology Investment Of the Gmentioning

confidence: 99%

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model with Subsidy on Green Supply Chain Technology Investment

Zhang

2019

Sustainability

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The green supply chain (GSC) can effectively reduce the waste of resources and avoid environmental pollution. For a closed-loop supply chain network consisting of multiple manufacturers, multiple retailers, and multiple consumer and recycling markets, we assume that retailers are responsible for the recycling of used products, manufacturers use raw materials to produce new products and recycled products for remanufacturing, and government departments subsidize all manufacturers and retailers for GSC technology investment. Then, the equilibrium conditions of manufacturers, retailers, demand markets, and recycling markets are obtained by using the variational inequality method, complementarity theorem, and Nash equilibrium theory, and the variational inequality model of the closed-loop supply chain network multiphase equilibrium is established. Based on numerical simulation, the optimal technology investment decision of green supply chain under different government subsidy rates, and the influence of market structure and enterprise cost asymmetry on the equilibrium solution of supply chain network are analyzed. The results show that government subsidies can effectively promote enterprises to upgrade their level of GSC technology investment. The intensification of enterprise competition and the asymmetry of enterprise costs will affect the composition of enterprise profits and the allocation of profits between enterprises, and the former will weaken the effect of government subsidies.

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Evolutionary game of the green investment in a two-echelon supply chain under a government subsidy mechanism

Cited by 160 publications

References 34 publications

Application of Threshold Regression Analysis to Study the Impact of Clean Energy Development on China’s Carbon Productivity

Application of Threshold Regression Analysis to Study the Impact of Clean Energy Development on China’s Carbon Productivity

Government Subsidy Strategies for Biosimilars R&D Based on Dynamic Game Theory

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model with Subsidy on Green Supply Chain Technology Investment

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