Evolutionary game of government safety supervision for prefabricated building construction using system dynamics

Zhang, Yuebin; Yi, Xin; Li, Shuangshuang; Qiu, Hui

doi:10.1108/ecam-06-2021-0501

Cited by 15 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Multi-stakeholder theory provides a more comprehensive dimension for understanding construction risk by incorporating the perspectives of different stakeholders, such as contractors, regulators and project owners. It has become a hot topic pursued by many scholars [ 58 , 59 ]. Compared with other studies, diverse perspectives ensure the framework captures a broader range of expected and unforeseen potential risks and facilitates effective communication and collaboration among stakeholders [ 60 , 61 ].…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing a risk framework for assembly construction based on stakeholder theory and structural equation modelling

Junjia,

Xiaoxiang,

Alias

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

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Occupational injuries in the construction industry have plagued many countries, and many cases have shown that accidents often occur because of a combination of project participants. Assembled construction (AC) projects have received extensive attention from Chinese scholars as a future trend, but few studies have explored the interrelationships and potential risks of various stakeholders in depth. This study fills this research gap by proposing a multi-stakeholder AC risk framework. The study surveyed 396 stakeholders, then analyzed the collected data and created a risk framework based on Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) and the CRITIC weighting method. The results revealed that factors like "regular supervision is a formality," "blindly approving the wrong safety measures," and "failure to organize effective safety education and training." are vital risks in AC of China. Finally, the study validates the risk factors and the framework with 180 real-life cases, which shows that the proposed framework is theoretically grounded and realistic. The study also suggests multi-level strategies such as introducing AI-based automated risk monitoring, improving the adaptability of normative provisions to technological advances, and advancing the culture of project communities of interest to ensure AC’s safe practices.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing a risk framework for assembly construction based on stakeholder theory and structural equation modelling

Junjia,

Xiaoxiang,

Alias

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

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“…Assumption 2 . Suppose the probability that workers adopt unsafe behavior is α ( α ∈ [0, 1]), and the probability that workers adopt safe behavior is (1 − α ) ( 52 ). The normal salary of workers is R 1 .…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of construction workers' unsafe behavior: Considering incentive and risk loss

Huang

Yang

et al. 2022

Front. Public Health

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The behavior of construction workers has a significant impact on the overall safety climate of a project. The purpose of this paper is to figure out the evolutionary pattern of workers' unsafe behavior and to minimize its occurrence. We constructed a two-sided evolutionary game model consisting of workers and managers to explore the focal point of interest, strategy equilibrium conditions, and behavior evolution process. The experimental results of stability analysis and system dynamics show that there are two stable states in all four cases, (Safe behavior, Negative management) as well as (Unsafe behavior, Negative management). The lower the initial willingness of workers to behave unsafely, the faster they reach a safe steady state. By contrast, managers' strategy choices have a certain lag. Workers are discouraged from choosing unsafe behavior under both the positive incentive of raising bonuses and the negative incentive of raising fines. And the sensitivity of the two incentives is similar. For indirect effect risk loss, when it is effectively controlled during safe construction, workers quickly gravitate toward safe behavior. These findings provide a reference for construction safety management. Several practical suggestions were proposed from three perspectives: the worker, the manager, and the site safety climate, focus on the theme of reducing unsafe behavior and achieving a virtuous cycle of safety climate.

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“…Among them, Liu et al combined prospect theory and evolutionary game theory analysis to find that the key to the long-term development of prefabricated buildings lies in reducing their construction costs [49]. Wang et al and Chen et al pointed out the impact of government regulation and management mechanisms on developers based on game theory [50,51]. It can be seen that although developers are the key subjects in choosing whether to develop prefabricated buildings or not, the government 0 s decision-making is also a key factor affecting the enthusiasm of developers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[ [50][51][52][53]56,57] G 3 : The government 0 s economic incentive costs, such as subsidies, tax relief, and incentives for prefabricated buildings. Among them, the proportion of subsidies received by the purchasers in total subsidy amount is r.…”

Section: Parameter Settings and Assumptions (Parameter Values Are Pos...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the tripartite evolution strategy of prefabricated building promotion based on the deepening of demand-side interests

Liu,

Chen

2023

PLoS ONE

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Under construction industry upgrading and environmental protection requirements, promoting prefabricated buildings is very important, but its development varies significantly in different regions. For example, it only accounts for 20% of the new construction area in China, and the overall development level is low. The promotion of prefabricated buildings involves multiple interests. Then, how to encourage all stakeholders to work together to promote its development is a crucial issue. This study obtains an evolutionary game model among the government, developers, and purchasers. Then the stability strategies of the stakeholders are given conditions. Finally, numerical simulation is used to validate theoretical findings and determine the sensitivity of key parameters to a subject’s behavior. The results show that: (1) There are two key factors that restrict the cooperation of stakeholders to promote prefabricated buildings, including the lack of government subsidies and the weak demand of the purchasers; (2) The government’s overall subsidy should not be too high, exceeding the government’s expenditure on environmental protection, and the subsidies for developers and purchasers must be reasonably allocated to effectively compensate for development benefits and purchase costs under limited expenditures. (3) Improving the residential environment of prefabricated buildings can significantly enhance the vested interests of purchasers, make up for their purchase costs, increase their willingness to purchase, and thus reduce the sales risk of developers.

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Evolutionary game of government safety supervision for prefabricated building construction using system dynamics

Cited by 15 publications

References 28 publications

Developing a risk framework for assembly construction based on stakeholder theory and structural equation modelling

Developing a risk framework for assembly construction based on stakeholder theory and structural equation modelling

An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of construction workers' unsafe behavior: Considering incentive and risk loss

Research on the tripartite evolution strategy of prefabricated building promotion based on the deepening of demand-side interests

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