Evolutionary game analysis on the implementation of subsidy policy for sustainable transportation development

Zhang, Linling; Long, Ruyin; Zheng, Hui; Li, Wenbo; Wei, Jia

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.122159

Cited by 35 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Their decisions often influence and restrict each other, and they are constantly adjusted according to the decisions of other subjects to maximize their own interests. Evolutionary game theory, as a method to deal with the bounded rationality of decision makers, has been widely used in supply chain management research (Zhang, L. et al,2020;Sun, H. et al,2019;Cui, H. et al,2020). It combines the game theory with dynamic evolution process, emphasizes the game balanced decision-making should be the outcome of dynamic learning, the adjustment and trial and error.…”

Section: Construction Of the Three-party Evolutionary Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Regulations on the corporate social irresponsibility in the supply chain under the multiparty game: Taking China's organic food supply chain as an example

Chen

Tian

et al. 2021

Journal of Cleaner Production

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This paper considers the lack of corporate social responsibility in the organic food supply chain in a new context, that is, the fraudulent subsidies claiming behavior of the manufacturers and the lack of organic food supervision of the fast-growing e-commerce retailers in China. We construct a three-party evolutionary game model among government regulatory departments, manufacturers and e-commerce retailers to analyze the evolution process of the behaviors of manufacturers and ecommerce retailers under government's changing regulation. The results show that: (1) The government can promote the production of organic food by the moderate supervision of manufacturers; Low intensity supervision cannot restrain fraudulent subsidies claiming behavior, while high intensity supervision will restrain the orderly development of organic food industry. (2)The greater the government subsidies on technology and R & D of manufacturers, the more conducive the manufacturerss will be to overcome technical problems and realize the scale of the organic food industry, so that it will eventually evolve towards the direction of active production of organic food. (3) The government's low-intensity fine on e-commerce retailers when they fail to fulfill their responsibilities is not enough to prompt them to choose the strategy of responsibility fulfillment, and the greater the fine is, the more conducive it is for them to evolve towards fulfilling their social responsibilities. (4) Appropriate government funding for e-commerce retailers will encourage them to fulfill their responsibility, but excessive funding will make e-commerce retailers over rely on government funding. Our research provides a better understanding of the irresponsible behavior of organic food supply chain enterprises, our management insights can help improve the government's regulation performance of such behavior, and can also provide a reference for other countries facing similar challenges.

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Section: Construction Of the Three-party Evolutionary Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Regulations on the corporate social irresponsibility in the supply chain under the multiparty game: Taking China's organic food supply chain as an example

Chen

Tian

et al. 2021

Journal of Cleaner Production

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“…ey analyze the dynamic trend and stable state of the evolutionary game under subsidy and punishment mechanisms. Zhang et al [35]adopt an evolutionary theoretical approach to analyze the implementation of the subsidy and penalty policy for sustainable transportation development. For a sustainable supply chain, Mahmoudi and Rasti-Barzoki [36] use an evolutionary game framework to explore the stable strategy of supply chain members under government intervention through an actual case study.…”

Section: Subsidy and Punishment Mechanism In An Evolutionarymentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of a Multiparticipant Game under a Subsidy and Punishment Mechanism: An Evolutionary Theory Perspective

Yang²

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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In a market with intense competition, cost pressures tempt enterprises to seek profits in ways that infringe on the interests of consumers. This is especially true when market sentiment is weak. In such situations, governments play a vital role in protecting consumers’ interests and helping struggling enterprises. We construct a tripartite game model that includes the government, enterprises, and consumers under a subsidy and punishment mechanism. We use this model to investigate the strategic choices made by the participants in an evolutionary game theory (EGT) framework. We present four stable equilibrium points as pure strategy solutions with the aid of a replicator dynamic system. Three main findings are presented in this paper. First, not all equilibrium points can be evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) when considering the potential motivations of the participants to change strategies. Second, there is an equilibrium point that satisfies the stability condition but changes periodically in its strategy space; strategy changes between participants are not synchronized. Third, the government prefers to subsidize enterprises when enterprise speculation is serious or when enterprise investment in improving production technology is high.

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“…e intensive punishment may accelerate strict surveillance on NIMBY project operation to ensure public interests and reduce the complaints [63]. However, the mechanism of sanction should be carefully designed to avoid trapping into a dilemma regarding trade-offs between economic development and environmental protection [64].…”

Section: Compensation For the Residents (D P )mentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Analysis to Conflicts among Stakeholders Involved in the Operation of Municipal Waste Incineration

Zhao

Huang

et al. 2020

Complexity

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This study presents an evolutionary game to model interactions among stakeholders with potential conflicts, including the operational enterprise of incineration plant, the local government, and the residents nearby. System dynamics is used to simulate the change of strategic actions corresponding to the three players, in order to seek for the evolutionary stability strategies. A numerical case is proposed to demonstrate the game theory application, in which the impacts of governmental incentive and punishment on the player’s actions are investigated. The results indicated that administrative penalty is effective not only in motivating the enterprises to upgrade treatment facilities for ensuring environmental quality but also in helping the local government and residents to approach dominant strategies. Policy implications are given based on the results to lay out a foundation for the alleviation of the conflicts.

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Evolutionary game analysis on the implementation of subsidy policy for sustainable transportation development

Cited by 35 publications

References 29 publications

Regulations on the corporate social irresponsibility in the supply chain under the multiparty game: Taking China's organic food supply chain as an example

Regulations on the corporate social irresponsibility in the supply chain under the multiparty game: Taking China's organic food supply chain as an example

Analysis of a Multiparticipant Game under a Subsidy and Punishment Mechanism: An Evolutionary Theory Perspective

An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Analysis to Conflicts among Stakeholders Involved in the Operation of Municipal Waste Incineration

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