Evolutionary game analysis of three parties in logistics platforms and freight transportation companies’ behavioral strategies for horizontal collaboration considering vehicle capacity utilization

Abstract

In China, logistics platforms are an effective way to solve vehicle capacity utilization using information sharing. However, most logistics platforms do not possess operational sustainability due to excessive profit-seeking. To address this problem, conflicts of interest among freight transportation participants are discussed using a stakeholder approach. A three-player evolutionary game model (TEGM) is developed to analyze the interactions among freight carriers, freight shippers, and logistics platforms. Then, the asymptotic equilibrium and evolutionary stability strategies of the three-player game are analyzed. The results indicate that a high-level positive network externality is the driving force behind the logistics platform’s “high-level service”. A fairness payment incentive guarantees a “sharing” strategy for freight carriers and shippers. When the high-level positive network externality is limited and lower than a threshold value, there is no stable equilibrium point in the TEGM. A government tax incentive cannot change the freight carriers’ and shippers’ strategy to participate in this horizontal collaboration system, except for the logistics platform’s probability of providing “high-level service”. However, the behavioral strategies of the freight transportation participants can be changed to achieve the sustainability of freight transportation by reducing the value-added tax rate through the logistics platform and increasing the high-level positive network externality of the logistics platform and other participants’ perceived fairness through a payment incentive. Finally, suggestions for regulating the behaviors of freight transportation participants and promoting the sustainability of freight transportation are discussed.

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of a Logistics Service Supply Chain Cooperation Mechanism for Network Freight Platforms

“…For instance, Deng et al developed a three-player evolutionary game model for analyzing the interactions among freight carriers, freight shippers, and logistics platforms. Ten, these researchers analyzed the asymptotic equilibrium and evolutionary stability strategies of the three-player game [6]. Bai et al studied the value cocreation impact mechanism of network freight platforms in the Internet of Tings environment and found that service-dominant logic, transport demand subject participation, and relational embeddedness all promote value cocreation [7].…”

“…Second, relatively little research has been conducted on the irrational or abnormal behaviors of participants. Most studies assume that all participants in this model are rational individuals who strictly abide by contracts; for instance, Deng et al investigated whether carriers and shippers are willing to share service capabilities and service information [6]. In real life, speculative behavior is likely to occur, and once such speculative behavior occurs, it inevitably afects the behavioral decisions of other participants.…”

“…For example, in the early stage of network freight mode development, government departments issued many support policies and fnancial subsidies and constantly worked to improve the relevant laws and regulations for regulating market behaviors. For example, the Chinese government has provided preferential tax policies for the development of network freight platforms and built relevant supporting facilities for network freight platforms [6]. All these measures afect the behavioral strategies of freight carriers and freight shippers.…”

“…With the rapid development of both the platform economy and information technology, the application of the network freight mode has emerged as an excellent means of solving these problems [6]. According to the statistics published by the Network Freight Information Exchange System of the Ministry of Transport of China, as of the end of 2022, there were 2537 network freight enterprises (including branch companies) in China that integrate 5.943 million pieces of scattered social transportation and 5.224 million drivers.…”

Effective Evolutionary Principles for System-of-Systems: Insights from Agent-Based Modeling in Vehicular Networks

“…Prior research has previously underscored the potential of information exchange to enhance information visibility within transportation systems [64]. Furthermore, the process of information exchange serves to eliminate obstructions between disparate systems, align the interests of stakeholders [65], and alleviate unwarranted variations within systems [66].…”