Evolutionary choice of markets

Gerber, Anke; Bettzüge, Marc Oliver

doi:10.1007/s00199-005-0063-5

Cited by 34 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…All of these papers they rely on the assumption of rational traders, and do not allow for learning. In terms of traders' behavior, the learning model of Gerber and Bettzüge [22] is relatively close to our paper. But since they focus in the possibility of multiplicity of active trading platforms, they consider neither non-market-clearing platforms nor market designers.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 69%

“…Hence, this setting can not be analyzed with the tools discussed before. To obtain μ * in this example, we can use Lemma 3.1 from Freidlin and Wentzell ([20]) 22 . They derive the limit invariant distribution μ * from an analysis of graphs in the state space Ω that are induced by the stationary Markovprocess P as follows.…”

Section: B1 Boundedly Rational Designersmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox

Alos-Ferrer,

Kirchsteiger,

Walzl

2007

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 69%

Section: B1 Boundedly Rational Designersmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox

Alos-Ferrer,

Kirchsteiger,

Walzl

2007

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…All of these papers rely on the assumption of rational traders and do not allow for learning. In terms of tradersÕ behaviour, the learning model of Gerber and Bettzü ge (2007) is relatively close to our article. But since they focus on the possibility of multiplicity of active trading platforms, they consider neither non-market-clearing platforms nor market designers.…”

mentioning

confidence: 54%

On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox

Alós–Ferrer

Kirchsteiger

Walzl

2009

The Economic Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether efficient platforms, leading to market -clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers are competing, we find that traders learn to select non-market clearing platforms with prices systematically above the market-clearing level, provided at least one such platform is introduced by a market designer. This in turn leads market designers to introduce non-market clearing platforms. Hence platform competition induces non-competitive market outcomes. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Code: C72, D4, D83, L1.Keywords: market institutions, evolution of trading platforms, learning, asymmetric rationality. We are grateful to Dan Friedman and seminar participants in Berlin, UL Brussels, University College London, Louvain-la-Neuve and Maastricht for helpful comments. Carlos Alós-Ferrer

show abstract

“…In a dynamic market, competition between platforms may reach a state of equilibrium. And from an evolutionary point of view, the equilibrium not only between platforms but also between markets can fluctuate due to the volume or cost levels of supply and demand (Ellison & Fudenberg, 2003;Gerber & Bettz€ uge, 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Platforms Competition: An Ecosystem-View Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Ma,

Zhao,

Dong

et al. 2023

SAGE Open

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The competition between platforms supported by digital technology, to a great extent, affects the structure of the whole industry and the fate of individual enterprises in the industry. For related enterprises, it is very important to clarify the influencing factors of platform competition equilibrium. This paper constructs a game model that includes platforms, suppliers, and the final consumers. We analyze the condition and stability of each equilibrium and the impacts of the characteristics of the core and complementary products on the equilibrium by using the method of evolutionary game. Our results show the following: (1) If the two platforms initially have separate advantages in terms of the number of suppliers or consumers, there will be an equilibrium of the coexistence of the two platforms; otherwise, there will be an equilibrium of single platform dominating. (2) The equilibrium of a single platform dominating is more stable than that of the coexistence of multiple platforms. (3) The equilibrium of coexistence is more easily broken by the occasional shock of increasing or decreasing the number of suppliers than by consumers. (4) Platforms with poor core product quality and a high price for core and complementary products can coexist with other superior platforms only if the former has more consumers and suppliers at the beginning of the competition. This paper not only enriches the research content in the field of platform competition, but also provides new ideas for them to develop appropriate competition strategies in combination with their own conditions.

show abstract

Evolutionary choice of markets

Abstract: Endogenous participation, Standardization, Evolution, Stochastic stability, C79, G10,

Cited by 34 publications

References 10 publications

On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox

On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox

On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox

Platforms Competition: An Ecosystem-View Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About