Evolution of Cooperation: Combining Kin Selection and Reciprocal Altruism into Matrix Games with Social Dilemmas

Ale, Som B.; Brown, Joel S.; Sullivan, Amy T.

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063761

Cited by 28 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 36 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Experiments involving pairs of unfamiliar fish that were either full siblings or unrelated revealed that relatedness enhanced the probability of joining the social partner to collectively inspect a dangerous predator [198]. This indicates that correlated pay-offs based on both relatedness and reciprocity may positively interact [209], even if negative interactions have been demonstrated as well in a pay-to-stay scenario [36,76].…”

Section: Which Conditions Select For Reciprocity?mentioning

confidence: 98%

Correlated pay-offs are key to cooperation

Taborsky

Frommen

Riehl

2016

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

122

199

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

One contribution of 18 to a theme issue 'The evolution of cooperation based on direct fitness benefits.' Subject Areas: behaviour, evolution, ecology Keywords: cooperation, reciprocity, commodity trading, direct fitness benefits, non-kin, decision rules The general belief that cooperation and altruism in social groups result primarily from kin selection has recently been challenged, not least because results from cooperatively breeding insects and vertebrates have shown that groups may be composed mainly of non-relatives. This allows testing predictions of reciprocity theory without the confounding effect of relatedness. Here, we review complementary and alternative evolutionary mechanisms to kin selection theory and provide empirical examples of cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals in a wide range of taxa. In particular, we focus on the different forms of reciprocity and on their underlying decision rules, asking about evolutionary stability, the conditions selecting for reciprocity and the factors constraining reciprocal cooperation. We find that neither the cognitive requirements of reciprocal cooperation nor the often sequential nature of interactions are insuperable stumbling blocks for the evolution of reciprocity. We argue that simple decision rules such as 'help anyone if helped by someone' should get more attention in future research, because empirical studies show that animals apply such rules, and theoretical models find that they can create stable levels of cooperation under a wide range of conditions. Owing to its simplicity, behaviour based on such a heuristic may in fact be ubiquitous. Finally, we argue that the evolution of exchange and trading of service and commodities among social partners needs greater scientific focus.

show abstract

Section: Which Conditions Select For Reciprocity?mentioning

confidence: 98%

Correlated pay-offs are key to cooperation

Taborsky

Frommen

Riehl

2016

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

122

199

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Kin selection and reciprocal altruism have been proposed to explain how cooperation develops (see Ale, Brown, Sullivan, 2013). Kinship can promote cooperation when the benefit to the recipient increases the evolutionary fitness of the donor (Hamilton, 1964).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in rats playing the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game

Wood

Kim

2016

Animal Behaviour

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Humans and animals show cooperative behaviour, but our understanding of cooperation among unrelated laboratory animals is limited. A classic test of cooperation is the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game, where two players receive varying payoffs for cooperation or defection in repeated trials. To determine whether unrelated rats cooperate in the IPD, we tested pairs of rats making operant responses to earn food reward in 25 trials/day. The operant chamber was bisected by a metal screen with a retractable lever and pellet dispenser on each side. When levers extended, rats had 2 s to respond. Mutual cooperation (Reward) delivered three pellets each, mutual defection (Punishment) provided no pellets, and unilateral defection (Temptation) gave five pellets to the defector, while the partner (Sucker) received none. In eight pairs of males (RM–) and females (RF–), cooperation was defined by withholding a response. In seven pairs of RM+ males, cooperation was defined by responding on the lever. In males, food restriction significantly inhibited both cooperation and pellets received. There was no effect of dominance status. Males and females made similar numbers of responses under ad libitum feeding. However, neither food restriction nor dominance status affected responses in females. Rats were subsequently tested for reciprocity in 24 alternating trials/day. A response on the lever within 5 s delivered three pellets to the partner. Females made significantly more responses for their cage-mate than males. Responses within pairs were significantly correlated for males, but not for females. For both sexes, responses declined significantly when paired with an unfamiliar partner who never reciprocated (‘bad stooge’). These results demonstrate that rats working for food show cooperation in IPD and direct reciprocity. Their responses depend on food availability and responses of their partner.

show abstract

“…Kin-selection and reciprocal altruism are often presented as opposing alternatives to explain cooperation [see Ale et al (2013)]. Reciprocal altruism promotes cooperation when long-term benefits accrue to partners interacting repeatedly, regardless of relationship (Trivers, 1971).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In other settings, they may benefit from cooperation, either for food (cooperative hunting in carnivores) or defense from predators [mobbing in birds (Clutton-Brock, 2009)]. Kin selection and reciprocal altruism have been proposed to explain how cooperation develops [see Ale et al (2013)]. Kinship can promote cooperation when the benefit to the recipient increases the evolutionary fitness of the donor (Hamilton, 1964).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Male rats play a repeated donation game

Wood

2017

Physiology & Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

While previous studies have demonstrated direct and generalized reciprocity in female Norway rats (Rutte and Taborsky, 2008), the present study determined if unrelated male laboratory rats respond on behalf of a partner in an iterated sequential game. Pairs of rats worked for food reward in an operant chamber, where participants alternated as Donor and Responder in successive trials. In each trial, the Donor chose between variable and constant reward levers, where the constant reward lever delivered 1 pellet, and the variable reward lever triggered insertion of Responder lever(s); the Donor received 2 pellets when the Responder made any response. In forced-choice constant (FC) trials, the Responder also received 1 pellet for responding on the constant reward lever. In forced-choice variable (FV) trials, the Responder received no pellets for responding on the variable reward lever. In free-choice (FR) trials, the Responder chose between constant (1 pellet) and variable reward levers (0 pellets). With their cagemate, rats earned 61.4±2.0 pellets (64.0±2.1% of 96 possible pellets). As Donor in FC trials, rats preferred the variable reward lever, and the Responder responded frequently. In FV trials, Donor preference for the variable reward lever declined as Responder lever responses decreased. In FR trials, rats alternated responding on variable and constant reward levers as Donor and Responder, respectively. When paired with a new partner, there was no effect on Donor responses, but responses by the Responder decreased in the FV block. Similar effects were observed when paired with a maximally-cooperative stooge. Importantly, rats did not adjust their behavior as Donor to receive more pellets. Results suggest that unrelated male rats will work on behalf of a partner, and that their behavior is sensitive to familiarity, and to cooperative responses by their partner.

show abstract

Evolution of Cooperation: Combining Kin Selection and Reciprocal Altruism into Matrix Games with Social Dilemmas

Cited by 28 publications

References 36 publications

Correlated pay-offs are key to cooperation

Correlated pay-offs are key to cooperation

Cooperation in rats playing the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game

Male rats play a repeated donation game

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About