Evidence for anti-intellectualism about know-how from a sentence recognition task

Harmon, Ian; Horne, Zachary

doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0894-y

“…These results fit nicely with the idea, voiced by others too (Bengson et al 2009;Gonnerman et al 2018), that the ordinary concept of knowledge-how is at least partly intellectualist, since this position too predicts an effect of epistemic luck on ordinary ascriptions of knowledge-how. Finally, our findings speak against those who have argued that the folk are purely anti-intellectualists with respect to knowledge-how (Harmon and Horne 2016). 27…”

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 92%

Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action

Pavese

¹

,

Henne

²

,

Beddor³

2023

Preprint

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Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck? While agentive luck and epistemic luck have been widely thought to be independent phenomena, we argue that agentive luck has an epistemic dimension. We present several thought experiments where epistemic luck seems to undermine both knowledge-how and intentional action and we report experimental results that corroborate these judgments. These findings have implications for the role of knowledge in a theory of intentional action and for debates about the nature of knowledge-how and the significance of knowledge representation in folk psychology.

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“…These results fit nicely with the idea, voiced by others too (Bengson, Moffett, & Wright 2009;Gonnerman, Mortensen, & Robbins 2018), that the ordinary concept of knowledge-how is at least partly intellectualist, since this position too predicts an effect of epistemic luck on ordinary ascriptions of knowledge-how. Finally, our findings speak against those who have argued that the folk are purely anti-intellectualists with respect to knowledge-how (Harmon & Horne 2016). 26…”

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 92%

Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action

Pavese,

Henne,

Beddor

et al. 2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

0

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Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck? While agentive luck and epistemic luck have been widely thought to be independent phenomena, we argue that agentive luck has an epistemic dimension. We present several thought experiments where epistemic luck seems to undermine both knowledge-how and intentional action and we report experimental results that corroborate these judgments. These findings have implications for the role of knowledge in a theory of intentional action and for debates about the nature of knowledge-how and the significance of knowledge representation in folk psychology.

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“…By contrast, anti-intellectualists argue for a separation between propositional knowledge and knowledge-how (Habgood-Coote 2018). Anti-intellectualism is widely accepted by epistemologists (Stanley and Williamson 2001) and coheres with how people typically think about knowing (Harmon and Horne 2016). A body of research in cognitive science and neuropsychology supports the distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that (Adams 2009;Glick 2011;Wallis 2008).…”

Section: The Knowledge Argument In the Classroommentioning

confidence: 96%

Keeping Students Out of Mary’s (Class)room

Brock

¹

,

Hay

²

2019

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Whilst many science educators, it is reported, associate knowledge with justified true belief (JTB), epistemologists have observed that the JTB model is an incomplete account of knowledge. Moreover, researchers from several fields have argued that developing scientific expertise involves not only the acquisition of knowledge that can be expressed in the form of a sentence, propositional knowledge, but also knowledge that cannot be articulated. This article examines the Mary's room thought experiment proposed by Frank Jackson and applies it to the context of science education. The thought experiment imagines a scientist, Mary, who has learned all the available scientific information about the physical properties of a tomato and the process of colour vision without directly experiencing the fruit. Jackson poses the question of whether Mary will gain new knowledge when she encounters a tomato for the first time. An argument is put forward that propositional and non-propositional knowledge are distinct, and a case is made for the value of non-propositional knowledge in learning science. An analogy is drawn between the scientist in Jackson's thought experiment and a learner in a science classroom who is taught propositional knowledge about a scientific concept without directly experiencing relevant phenomena. It is argued that this approach to teaching fails to develop the learner's non-propositional knowledge. A number of strategies for supporting learners to develop non-propositional knowledge are discussed. It is argued that science educators should consider the phenomenological curriculum, the experiences that students should be introduced to alongside propositional knowledge, in order to develop scientific understanding.

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Evidence for anti-intellectualism about know-how from a sentence recognition task

Cited by 11 publications

References 26 publications

Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action

Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action

Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action

Keeping Students Out of Mary’s (Class)room

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