Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action

Abstract

Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck? While agentive luck and epistemic luck have been widely thought to be independent phenomena, we argue that agentive luck has an epistemic dimension. We present several thought experiments where epistemic luck seems to undermine both knowledge-how and intentional action and we report experimental results that corroborate these judgments. These findings have implications for the role of knowledge in a theory of intentional action and for debates about the nature of knowledge-how and the significance of knowledge representation in folk psychology.

The know-how solution to Kraemer's puzzle

“…In six experiments, we find evidence that supports it. This work accords with a burgeoning area of action theory that identifies an important connection between know-how and intentionality (Ryle, 1949;Cath, 2015;Pavese, 2018;2020;Pavese et al, 2023). We conclude that this understanding of the Kraemer effect in terms of know-how provides a satisfying solution to Kraemer's puzzle.…”

“…So, our work on Kraemer's puzzle and the know-how effect suggest that the ordinary concept of know-how is one on which, for one to know how to perform an action, one needs to know a reliable way to perform it. As such, it contributes to the recent discussion on the nature of the ordinary concept of know-how (Gonnerman et al, 2018;Pavese et al, 2023).…”

“…Our work on judgments of know-how deepens the connection between skills and intentional action. Further work can explore this connection as it may resolve further issues in the folk psychology of intentional action (Setiya, 2012;Pavese, 2016;Shepherd, 2021;Pavese, 2021;Pavese et al, 2023).…”

Separating action and knowledge

“…30 Or one might ask whether the respondents are distinguishing clearly enough between attributing intentionality and attributing an intention. 31 Additionally, there is a large body of continually growing work on how the folk understand the relationship between intentional action, knowledge, and the ethical (e.g., Pavese and Henne 2023). Rather than seriously engage with these important concerns or with the more general debate about the philosophical import of experimental work on ordinary language concepts-something that I do not think I could do sufficiently well in this context-I offer a second independent argument for my proposal that intentional action is intrinsically ethical.…”