Evaluating land administration systems: A comparative method with an application to Peru and Honduras

Abstract

a b s t r a c tThis article develops a comparative methodology for the evaluation of national land administration systems. We propose a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators with benchmarks for each one of them that signal possible venues to improve the administration's structure and budgetary/management arrangements, in order to bring about the following goals: (1) to contribute to public sector financing through taxes; (2) to encourage the productive and sustainable use of land, and (3) to facilitate access to land for low-income citizens. This methodology was applied to the cases of Honduras and Peru in order to refine our draft evaluation indicators, while evaluating the systems of both countries. Here we present the final refined indicators and benchmarks, and the conclusions from both case studies.

Indicator scarcity on cadastre and land registration in cross-country information sources

“…Bandeira et al (2010) suggest a comparative method based on a wide range of indicators capturing institutional structures, performance and outputs, while using statistical averages of performance indicators of mature systems as benchmarks.…”

“…(Bandeira et al, 2010). A classical understanding of land administration arrangements was illustrated by McLaughlin and Dale (1988, p. 7, Fig.…”

“…Mitchell et al (2008) discussed the limitations in the evaluation of land administration projects, while Bandeira et al (2010) proposed methodologies and indicators for comparison of land administration systems in a wider context including functions of taxation, land use and market regulations as applied to Perú and Honduras. Bandeira et al analyzed benchmarking of land administration systems by use of both descriptive indexes and evaluation tools, in view of the challenges of availability and reliability of data.…”

Tribal Governance: The Business of Blockchain Authentication

“…Assets as lands are both valuable and necessary, thereby lucrative for fraud or corruption. Fraudulent renting, expropriations, extortion, and bribery are as well documented as corruption in dealing with governmental or notary third parties [49,54,56].…”

Assessing the Effects of ‘Stand-alone’ Structuration of Land Administration System on Urban Land Delivery and Accessibility in Nigeria

“…It is thus assumed whenever institutions are being defined, that the institutions function like the rules of a game in society, where the stakeholders involved are the organisations who act as players Abdullah [2]. Simply put, institutions must be larger horizons than organisations, though in terms of implementation, institutions may be affected by several main formal and informal constraints, such as law, regulation and property rights could be formal constraints, while culture, custom and incentives can be seen as informal constraints clogging effective land management [8].…”