Evade, Corrupt, or Confront? Organized Crime and the State in Brazil and Mexico

Abstract

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Counterproductive Punishment: How Prison Gangs Undermine State Authority

“…In the latter two, prison gangs can now use the threat of debilitating violence to force authorities into negotiation. California may lie further to the left in Figure 1: the stark racial cleavages that define U.S. gangs may prevent the emergence of "universal" and hegemonic gangs like the PCC, who are better able to carry out and reap the benefits of direct confrontation (Bailey and Taylor 2009).…”

The Impact of Drug-Related Violence on Corruption in Mexico

“…Yet, numerous studies as well as Mexican history suggest otherwise: that there is no inherent relationship linking the two (Friman , Naylor , Williams ). First, violence is costly and bad for business (Bailey and Taylor ; Naylor ). Criminal organizations consequently try to avoid violence and prefer to operate under the radar by cooperating with one another and “corrupt[ing] enough state officials to maintain sufficient freedom of action for their activities” (Williams , 325).…”

Does Dirty Harry Have the Answer?

“…Not only have crime rates risen (as measured by national homicide rates), but under new democratic regimes, crime often also takes center stage in a media no longer curbed by censorship (Bailey and Taylor 2009;Pérez 2003;Seligson 2005;Seligson and Azpuru 2001). Under democracy, citizens are more likely to experience crime personally, as well as to hear about it more frequently in the news.…”

“…Bailey and Taylor (2009) also highlight the difference between organized and nonorganized crime, providing a comparative analysis of organized crime's confrontation with state forces in Brazil and Mexico, and discussing the impact of organized crime on state monopolization of force and legitimacy.…”