Eurozone Justice

Viehoff, Juri

doi:10.1111/jopp.12168

Cited by 13 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 32 publications

(9 reference statements)

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“…They influence not only material outcomes, but opportunity spaces and even individuals' aspirations and preferences. This argument limits economic inequalities to ensure 'robust non-exploitability' (Viehoff, 2018). But limited economic inequality across the European order may remain, especially if important spheres of life such as education, health care or unemployment protection are insulated from markets (Walzer, 1983).…”

Section: Contractualist Grounds For Claims To Equal Sharesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A just yet unequal European Union: a defense of moderate economic inequality*

Føllesdal

2021

Review of Social Economy

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What does justice require concerning socio-economic distribution among citizens of the European Union? The EU should reduce cross-national economic inequalities among inhabitants of different member states, but full economic distributive equality or a European 'Difference Principle,' may not be required. Individuals' claim to more political influence over matters controlled by their own state in the quasi-federal EU may permit some economic inequality. Section 1 orients this contribution relative to arguments for a European universal income. Section 2 provides relevant features of the EU. Section 3 considers contractualist arguments against certain forms of economic inequality, while section 4 identifies a further argument in favour of equal shares of benefits of social cooperation, based on an interpretation of 'social primary goods' consistent with Rawls' theory. Section 5 argues that these reasons for economic distributive equality must be weighed against more political influence over matters controlled by the individual's sub-unit.

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Section: Contractualist Grounds For Claims To Equal Sharesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A just yet unequal European Union: a defense of moderate economic inequality*

Føllesdal

2021

Review of Social Economy

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“…Viehoff provides a third type of argument, which directly invokes demands of justice. His “Eurozone justice” is coined in terms of background justice (Viehoff, 2018, p. 395, note 28): the principles govern relations between member states, not between individuals. A monetary union should respect a principle of robust non‐exploitability: its arrangements must not foreseeably create conditions of vulnerability in some member states that are likely to engender exploitation in core domains of their effective economic sovereignty, by other states, creditors or banks.…”

Section: Background Justice and Income Insurancementioning

confidence: 99%

The EU's role in income redistribution and insurance: Support, norm‐setter or provider? A review of justice‐based arguments

Vandenbroucke¹

2021

European J of Philosophy

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Income redistribution and insurance are core functions of welfare states. What role should the EU play in this domain? I examine the purchase of normative theorizing on social justice on this question, focusing on the contrast between three models of EU involvement: the EU as Support, which implies the sharing of resources through intergovernmental transfers; the EU as Provider, which implies EU cross-border transfers towards individual citizens; the EU as Norm-setter, which implies that the EU formulates normative policy ideals. I review different accounts of justice for the EU and how they bear on the choice between these models of EU involvement. Conceptions of "background justice" have some purchase in a debate on the EU's role, but that purchase is limited. They need to be complemented by shared conceptions of domestic justice and a degree of moral cosmopolitanism. I argue that a "European Social Union" should be a Support and Norm-setter in the realm of insurance and redistribution. Through the establishment of interstate insurance, it would be a true "insurance union." It would engage in interstate redistribution, but there are no compelling reasons of justice for it to become a direct Provider of insurance or redistribution towards individual citizens.Frank Vandenbroucke was formerly in University of Amsterdam.

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“… 2. An exception is Viehoff (2018), who focuses specifically on monetary unions and briefly discusses the problem of trade imbalances (p. 406). While political philosophers have yet to explore the topic, politicians and commentators wrangle about how to deal with trade imbalances.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 6. It is worth noting that Juri Viehoff’s account of justice for the Eurozone endorses the standard of non-domination as well (Viehoff, 2018). Viehoff suggests the Principle of Robust Non-Exploitability.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Viehoff suggests the Principle of Robust Non-Exploitability. According to the principle, monetary arrangements should neither exploit any state nor foreseeably create conditions of vulnerability likely to engender exploitation by other agents, such as states, creditors, or banks (Viehoff, 2018: 401). While the principle is ostensibly about exploitation, Viehoff explains exploitation by appeal to domination: Members are exploitable when others ‘can instrumentalize vulnerability to exact advantage through domination’ (Viehoff, 2018: 401).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Dealing fairly with trade imbalances in monetary unions

Meyer

2021

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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Politicians around the globe wrangle about how to deal with trade imbalances. In the Eurozone, members running a trade deficit accuse members running a surplus of forcing them into deficit. Yet political philosophers have largely overlooked issues of justice related to trade imbalances. I address three such issues. First, what, if anything, is wrong with trade imbalances? I argue that in monetary unions, trade imbalances can lead to domination between member states. Second, who should bear the burden of rebalancing trade? I argue that surplus and deficit countries should share that burden. The current situation placing the burden squarely on deficit countries is unjust. Third, which institutional arrangements should monetary unions adopt to regulate trade balances? Monetary unions can either reduce trade imbalances within the monetary union, neutralise the impact of trade imbalances on the economic sovereignty of member states, or delegate economic policy affecting trade balances to a legitimate supranational institution. The Eurozone must adopt one of these options to prevent member states from domination. Which option protects members best against domination depends on what makes interference between members arbitrary, an unresolved question in republican theories of justice.

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Eurozone Justice

Cited by 13 publications

References 32 publications

A just yet unequal European Union: a defense of moderate economic inequality*

A just yet unequal European Union: a defense of moderate economic inequality*

The EU's role in income redistribution and insurance: Support, norm‐setter or provider? A review of justice‐based arguments

Dealing fairly with trade imbalances in monetary unions

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