Eurosceptics in trilogue settings: interest formation and contestation in the European Parliament

Abstract

Trilogues have been studied as sites of secluded inter-institutional decision making that gather the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission. Trilogues, however, are not exempt from formal and informal party-political dynamics that affect intraand inter-institutional contestation. The increase in Eurosceptics in the 2014 EP elections offers an opportunity to investigate their efforts to shape the position and behaviour of the EP negotiating team in trilogues. Therefore, this article investigates to what extent Eurosceptic party groups participate in trilogue negotiations and how mainstream groups deal with their presence. The analysis shows that the opportunities to participate in trilogues and shape the EP's position are higher for those perceived as soft Eurosceptic MEPs, while mainstream groups apply a 'cordon sanitaire' to those perceived as being part of hard Eurosceptic groupswhich reduces the chances of MEPs from those groups being willing to participate in parliamentary work.

Engaging the disengaged? Explaining the participation of Eurosceptic MEPs in trilogue negotiations

“…The ENF and the EFDD (except for the M5S) were systematically excluded from coalitions and their amendments did not survive the preparatory stage. This confirms findings from our previous research, which showed how shadows meetings might give a voice to hard-Eurosceptics but did not offer them an actual chance to influence policy positions (Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019a;Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019b). In spite of this, the content analysis reveals the irrelevance of the cordon sanitaire when it comes to excluding far-right and populist voices.…”

“…When it comes to the former, we see a clear use of the cordon sanitaire that allowed mainstream groups to disengage from the ENF and from the non-M5S members of the EFDD. This confirms previous findings that these groups are seen as outcasts and actively isolated by mainstream groups (Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019a). This strategy does not necessarily respond to the ideological content of their amendments, given that the EPP parroted the anti-immigration and securityled positions of the far-right and populist parties from the ENF and ECR.…”

“…This is in line with previous findings that the M5S are 'outsiders' in the legislative work. As such, they are allowed to participate but mainstream groups do not see them as trusted partners and therefore bypass them when not needed to build a majority (Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019a).…”

“…However, this dynamic is not newthe previous legislative period (2014-2019) already experienced higher levels of polarization, which translated into unstable coalitions and a blurring of the left-right divide (Ripoll Servent, 2018). This shift in internal dynamics also had consequences for inter-institutional relationssince it made it more difficult for the EP to build a common position to represent in legislative negotiations, potentially affecting the EP's chances of success under co-decision (Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019a). Therefore, it is important to understand how the presence of more Eurosceptic and populist forces in the EP affects its role as co-legislator, especially in informal settings of decision-making, where individual members of the European Parliament (MEPs) may have higher chances to influence policy outputs.…”

Towards a unified anti-Europe narrative on the right and left? The challenge of Euroscepticism in the 2019 European elections

“…Second, the cordon sanitaire is still very effective. Mainstream politicians do not want to cooperate with Eurosceptics or let them have any kind of influence (Brack, 2018; Ripoll Servent and Panning, 2019; Startin, 2010). For instance, they have excluded them from any position of responsibility at the beginning of the new parliamentary term: while according to the D’Hondt system in place in the EP, the radical right group should have received two vice-presidencies of the EP as well as two chairmanships of parliamentary committees, the other groups disregarded the informal rules to elect MEPs from other groups to these positions.…”