Towards a unified anti-Europe narrative on the right and left? The challenge of Euroscepticism in the 2019 European elections

Abstract

In the aftermath of a decade of crisis, the 2019 European Parliament elections confirmed the results of the 2014 elections as voters turned away from the traditional political families to vote for parties with a strong message on Europe, including Eurosceptic parties. It further evidenced the normalization of Euroscepticism, which has become a stable component of European politics. But should one talk of Euroscepticism or rather of Euroscepticisms? This contribution focuses on 19 radical right and radical left parties, more specifically the parties from Western Europe belonging to the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) and the Identity and Democracy (I/D) groups. Through an analysis of the electoral manifestos, it analyses how the European Union has been framed by the parties and whether we can speak of a ‘unified Eurosceptic narrative’. More specifically, this article concentrates on three issues that have been at the heart of the recent crises: the European Union’s reform and how the regime itself is framed in a post-crisis context, the Economic and Monetary Union well as migration and free movement.

Opting for Opt‐outs? National Identities and Support for a Differentiated EU

“…My results thus suggest that the increasingly Eurosceptic discourses found in central and eastern Europe (Börzel and Risse, 2020) could potentially play a greater role in shaping support for differentiated integration than historical exposure to it. This assumption also aligns with recent literature on how party cues shape popular support for the EU (Telle et al, 2022) However, the effects may also be driven by the generally sovereigntist objections to the EU that are prevalent in the Nordics and central and Eastern Europe (Brack, 2020;Kriesi, 2016). Such sentiments are particularly likely to be found among exclusively national citizens.…”

“…An increasingly Eurosceptic discourse in Central and Eastern Europe in recent years (Börzel and Risse, 2020; Cianciara, 2014) may also have produced greater support for differentiated integration, despite the critical framing of it. As the Eurosceptic elite discourses found in both regions strongly focus on sovereignty (Brack, 2020; Kriesi, 2016), a similar cueing effect to the one posited above could lead to greater support for differentiated integration amongst exclusive nationals in both regions compared with the rest of the EU. This leads to two competing theoretical expectations: first, the positive elite framing of differentiation in the Nordics may lead to greater support for it amongst exclusive nationals in these countries compared with Central and Eastern Europe.…”

Plan B for Europe: The Birth of ‘Disobedient Euroscepticism’?

“…Thus, Dunphy and March refer to this position as ‘EU‐scepticism’ or even ‘actually existing EU‐scepticism’; they do not explore, though, how this category might fit in existing typologies or whether it requires a new one altogether. Most recently, Brack (2020) has shown, after analysing the electoral manifestos of 19 radical left and right parties, that these two political families do not share a common Eurosceptic narrative or objective.…”

Immigration within the European Union Increases Support for Eurosceptic Parties

“…The outcome variable of interest is measured as the local-level share of votes cast for Eurosceptic parties from all valid votes cast in the locality. To identify left-and right-wing Eurosceptic parties, I rely on party manifestos, media statements, membership of the EP transnational party groups and existing classifications and theoretical discussions (Heinisch, McDonnell, and Werner 2020;Halikiopoulou, Nanou, and Vasilopoulou 2012;Pirro, Taggart, and van Kessel 2018;van Elsas and van Der Brug 2015;van Elsas, Hakhverdian, and van der Brug 2016;Brack 2020). The definition of Euroscepticism is 'softer' than the most restrictive one that would only include parties that explicitly argue for a dissolution of the EU and a reversal of European integration, but 'harder' that the most inclusive one that would cover any party that is critical of any policy or institutions of the EU.…”