2005
DOI: 10.2143/ja.293.1.2002082
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Études sur la philosophie de Dharmakārti (II)

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“…What's more, this reflexive perceptual acquaintance is ultimately non‐representational, insofar as awareness intrinsically lacks a representational structure ( ākāra ) involving an intentional object to be apprehended ( grāhya ) and a vehicle that carries out that apprehension ( grāhaka ) (Kellner, 2017a, 2017b). The appearance of any dualistic representational structure – even in the putatively non‐conceptual perception of objects – is a fundamentally cognitive illusion that happens to be as experientially stubborn as illusions born of sensory defects (Eltschinger, 2005, pp. 169–171; Eltschinger, 2009a, p. 61; but cf.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…What's more, this reflexive perceptual acquaintance is ultimately non‐representational, insofar as awareness intrinsically lacks a representational structure ( ākāra ) involving an intentional object to be apprehended ( grāhya ) and a vehicle that carries out that apprehension ( grāhaka ) (Kellner, 2017a, 2017b). The appearance of any dualistic representational structure – even in the putatively non‐conceptual perception of objects – is a fundamentally cognitive illusion that happens to be as experientially stubborn as illusions born of sensory defects (Eltschinger, 2005, pp. 169–171; Eltschinger, 2009a, p. 61; but cf.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%