Ethnic Inequality and the Strength of Ethnic Identities in Sub-Saharan Africa

Higashijima, Masaaki; Houle, Christian

doi:10.1007/s11109-017-9430-8

Cited by 22 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…In particular, our findings indicate that the findings of Houle, Kenny, and Park () regarding the effects of BGI and WGI transfer down to the individual level. Our findings also provide support for the research of Higashijima and Houle (), who find that ethnic identities are strengthened when BGI is high and WGI is low. The findings of our analysis suggest that not only are ethnic identities strengthened when BGI is high and WGI is low, but these economic conditions appear to also increase the likelihood that individuals will vote as part of an ethnic bloc for a given political party.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 88%

“…They find that BGI increases the likelihood of a coup, but only when WGI is low. In a recent study using survey data from Afrobarometer, Higashijima and Houle () find that BGI increases the degree to which individuals identify with their ethnic group, but that the effects of BGI on ethnic identification weaken as WGI increases. In another study closely related to our research, Houle, Kenny, and Park () analyze the combined effects of BGI and WGI on ethnic voting; using group‐level data on 200 groups in 65 countries, they find that increases in BGI increase ethnic voting, but only when WGI decreases.…”

Section: Ethnic Bloc Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Structural Inequality and Ethnic Bloc Voting*

Stewart

McGauvran

2019

Social Science Quarterly

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Objective. A large body of ethnic politics literature suggests that horizontal inequalities exacerbate ethnic conflict. However, the relationship between intergroup inequality and ethnic bloc voting behavior has escaped empirical analysis. We test the relationship between ethnic bloc voting and horizontal inequality by examining how relative disparity affects individuals' probability of supporting the same political party as other co-ethnics. Methods. This project uses data from the Integrated World and European Values Survey to test the relationship between relative disparity and ethnic bloc support in ethnically polarized states from 1981 to 2006. Results. Our findings indicate that the probability of supporting the same party as other co-ethnics is influenced by within-group as well as between-group inequality, while being relatively unaffected by individual-level income. Conclusion. We conclude that increasing horizontal inequality, and not individual resources, leads to higher rates of ethnically polarized voting, which may lead to greater levels of ethnic conflict.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 88%

Section: Ethnic Bloc Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural Inequality and Ethnic Bloc Voting*

Stewart

McGauvran

2019

Social Science Quarterly

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“…In particular, researchers found that support in redistribution decreases most strongly when minorities are poorer or perceived as such. These studies argue that higher inequality between identity groups increases their perceived social and cultural distance, leading in turn to increased in-group identification (Higashijima & Houle 2017), decreased solidarity (Lupu & Pontusson 2011) and stronger stigmatisation of poor minorities (Gilens 1995;Kinder & Sears 1981;Nelson 1999). Intergroup inequality also exacerbates the social threat posed to richer identity groups by generous redistribution, which could mobilise poorer identity groups into the former's communities and undermine their relative social status (Corneo & Grüner 2002;Shayo 2009).…”

Section: Existing Research On Diversity Intergroup Inequality and Rementioning

confidence: 99%

Retracted: The heterogeneous effect of diversity: Ascriptive identities, class and redistribution in developed democracies

Yakter

2018

European J Political Res

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The current consensus among comparative political scientists postulates that diverse democracies redistribute less than do homogeneous ones. However, whereas homogeneous democracies do redistribute more on average, diverse democracies exhibit high variation in redistributive outcomes. Why does ascriptive heterogeneity stifle redistribution in some cases but not in others? In this article, it is argued that diversity undermines redistributive outcomes when identity groups differ more starkly in their income levels. More importantly, under these conditions, the policy outcomes are not uniform: rather than general cutbacks, richer groups selectively under‐prioritise benefits and access for poorer, minority‐heavy groups while keeping their own redistributive interests protected. The result is not simply less redistribution aggregately, but a more exclusionary and regressive welfare state that prioritises the special needs of better‐off identity groups. Empirical support is found in these hypotheses using macro‐comparative panel data on multiple redistributive aspects in 22 developed democracies in the years 1980–2011. The article thus outlines a conditional and more nuanced relationship between diversity and redistributive outcomes than commonly assumed, as well as several broader lessons for research of identity politics and social policy.

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“…Individuals' group identification will be undermined whenever they do not live under the same conditions as other members of their group or do not share a common group history of deprivation or advantage. Recent work by Higashijima and Houle (2017) supports the idea that BGI increases ethnic identification but only when WGI is low.…”

Section: Ethnic Inequality and Ethnic Votingmentioning

confidence: 84%

“…This section provides original empirical evidence in favor of our first mechanism, according to which BGI should increase the gap between the preferences over redistribution of rich and poor groups, especially when WGI is low. We do not directly test the second mechanism because there is already an article that provides such a test using BGI and WGI measures similar to ours (Higashijima and Houle 2017). Using the Afrobarometer, they show that BGI increases the likelihood that a respondent identifies more strongly with his or her ethnicity than his or her nationality and that BGI's effect weakens as WGI increases.…”

Section: Preferences For Redistributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Structure of Ethnic Inequality and Ethnic Voting

Houle

Kenny

Park

2019

The Journal of Politics

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Why do some ethnic groups vote along ethnic lines while others do not? In this article, we theorize that the level of ethnic voting depends, partially, on how ethnicity interacts with economic cleavages. Specifically, we argue that betweenethnic group inequality (BGI) increases ethnic voting and that its effect strengthens as within-ethnic group inequality (WGI) decreases. We thus posit that the full structure of ethnic inequality, not only between-group differences, matters for ethnic voting. After presenting our argument, we conduct the first cross-national test of whether the effect of betweengroup inequality on ethnic voting is conditional on the level of inequality within ethnic groups. Our analysis employs group-level data on 200 ethnic groups from 65 countries. We find strong support for our hypothesis: BGI increases ethnic voting, but its effect is conditional on WGI.

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Ethnic Inequality and the Strength of Ethnic Identities in Sub-Saharan Africa

Cited by 22 publications

References 37 publications

Structural Inequality and Ethnic Bloc Voting*

Structural Inequality and Ethnic Bloc Voting*

Retracted: The heterogeneous effect of diversity: Ascriptive identities, class and redistribution in developed democracies

The Structure of Ethnic Inequality and Ethnic Voting

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