Ethnic conflict goes mobile

Abstract

This analysis contributes to the body of research testing the effect of mobile phone availability on the probability of violent conflict by shifting the unit of analysis to that of distinct ethnic groups. This approach provides two important advantages. First, it tests the robustness of this relationship by determining whether this effect maintains when shifted to a more rigorous and theoretically appropriate level of analysis. Second, shifting the analysis to the group level also enables tests of specific characteristics that may condition the effect of mobile phone availability on violent collective action. The first set of characteristics test whether mobile phone availability primarily increases a group's opportunities to engage in violent collective action as a result of decreased organizational costs due to diminished communication costs. The second set of characteristics explore whether mobile phone availability makes violent collective action more likely as a result of increasing a group's motivation to organize, thanks to enabling more efficient communication about shared grievances between group members. The results yield mixed support for both of these potential mechanisms, providing needed insight into the dynamics at play in this relationship -a matter that very much remains in the 'black box' at this point in time.

Studying the Internet and Violent conflict

“…Comparing traditional mass media and cell phones more generally, Warren (2015) shows that across African countries, increased penetration of mass media has a pacifying effect, whereas increases in cell phone connectivity have the opposite effect. Cross-country evidence by Bailard (2015) shows that cell phones can help ethnic groups overcome barriers to effective organization, such as being geographically dispersed, as well as allow them to communicate more effectively about shared grievances. Both of these mechanisms are positively associated with an increase in violence.…”

Constraints and military coordination: How ICTs shape the intensity of rebel violence

“…Empirical studies find that both effects are possible. Some scholars suggest that ICTs allow armed groups to overcome collective action problems (Bailard 2015;Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013), or that ICTs enable horizontal ways of communicating that sow division within societies, leading to more rebel violence (Warren 2015). In contrast, other scholars find that ICTs reduce the likelihood of violent attacks from armed groups because new technologies allow civilians to provide information to counterinsurgents (Shapiro and Weidmann 2015), although such information might incite rebels to use different tactics rather than end violence completely (Shaver 2018).…”

“…We make several contributions to the recent literature about technology and violent conflict (Gohdes 2018;Zeitzoff 2017). One is that, although several studies analyze the effect of new ICTs on the patterns of rebel violence (Bailard 2015;Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013;Siegel 2015, 2015;Warren 2015), none of these studies mention the effect of ICTs on the intensity of violence provoked by armed groups nor how this effect might differ with the type of technology. 1 Exploring how and through which mechanisms ICTs shape the intensity of armed group violence is important for two reasons.…”

“…As communication is essential to coordinate in any kind of collective action, including military operations (Bimber, Flanagin, and Stohl 2005, 374;Bailard 2015), we theorize that when access to mobile phones increase, rebels acquire better military coordination. We suggest this effect is possible because of the basic functions of mobile phones such as telephony and message services (SMS), as they improve communication inside rebel groups.…”

“…Increased communication through cell phones can enhance mutual expectations that internal factions will join military operations increasing the likelihood of violent events (Little 2016). Moreover, cell phones would allow rebel commanders to monitor compliance with their plans given they can easily know who the free-riders are, locate them, and punish them (Bailard 2015;Johnston 2008;Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013). In Liberia, for instance, commanders of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy were successful in punishing subordinates and controlling defections precisely because commanders could monitor subordinates with the use of cell phones (Johnston 2008, 127-28).…”