“…Perhaps the most representative paradigm is when a participant chooses between two (or more) potential partners for an economic interaction, whether that be a trust game (see Table 1 for a description of this and other economic games referenced here) (Bornhorst, Ichino, Kirchkamp, Schlag, & Winter, 2010;Bostyn & Roets, 2017;Everett et al, 2016;Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2016;Pleasant & Barclay, 2018), a prisoner's dilemma (Aksoy, 2015), or a dictator game (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006;. Closely related are contexts in which participants interact with a partner and decide whether they would like to play an economic game with that partner again or with a different partner, either in a subsequent dyadic context (Barclay & Willer, 2007;Coricelli, Fehr, & Fellner, 2004;Eisenbruch & Roney, 2017;Gross, Leib, Offerman, & Shalvi, 2018;Martin & Cushman, 2015;Sylwester & Roberts, 2010 or a group context (Liddell & Kruschke, 2014;Page, Putterman, & Unel, 2005;Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011). We note that these group exclusion decisions have been previously studied under the heading of ostracism.…”