Ethical and Philosophical Consideration of the Dual-use Dilemma in the Biological Sciences

Abstract

The dual-use dilemma arises in the context of research in the biological and other sciences as a consequence of the fact that one and the same piece of scientific research sometimes has the potential to be used for bad as well as good purposes. It is an ethical dilemma since it is about promoting good in the context of the potential for also causing harm, e.g., the promotion of health in the context of providing the wherewithal for the killing of innocents. It is an ethical dilemma for the researcher because of the potential actions of others, e.g., malevolent non-researchers who might steal dangerous biological agents, or make use of the original researcher's work. And it is a dilemma for governments concerned with the security of their citizens, as well as their health. In this article we construct a taxonomy of types of "experiments of concern" in the biological sciences, and thereby map the terrain of ethical risk. We then provide a series of analyses of the ethical problems and considerations at issue in the dual-use dilemma, including the impermissibility of certain kinds of research and possible restrictions on dissemination of research results given the risks to health and security. Finally, we explore the main available institutional responses to some of the specific ethical problems posed by the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences.

Dual-use research and the H5N1 bird flu: Is restricting publication the solution to biosecurity issues?

“…32 Major differences in assessment of the term 'dangerous' in association with DURC might either result in the underestimation of risks and threats or may lead to the restriction of legitimate academic research. Thus, it has become more important than ever for the scientific community to address public concerns over DURC by establishing a transparent governance system (see Miller and Selgelid (2008) for an overview of possible options).…”

The roles of ethics in gene drive research and governance

“…That potential for 'dual use' or intentional harmful and nefarious applications of a technology are not considered within the standard institutional review procedures of research ethics is noted in the report, and can also be interpreted and analyzed as a hazard. A number of emerging technologies are now being debated in connection with their potential for intentional abuse as well as their potentially destabilizing impact on international security and the policing abilities of national states (Miller and Selgelid 2007;NASEM 2016, 69-70).…”

On the Dual Uses of Science and Ethics: Principles, Practices, and Prospects

“…The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) in December 2011 recommended that the findings of these studies be published, but that detailed description of materials and methods be omitted from the published articles. 9 After a highly publicised World Health Organisation (WHO) meeting reached the opposite conclusion in February 2012-recommending that the studies eventually be published in full 10 -the NSABB reversed its initial decision in March 2012. 11 Revised (fully detailed) versions of the papers in question were finally published in Science 12 and Nature 13 in June 2012.…”

“…Individual scientists (insofar as they are at liberty) must decide what research to conduct and/or publish. Research institutions (insofar as they are at liberty) must decide how to regulate potentially dangerous research within their confines; how to educate 9 13 Imai, M., Watanabe, T., Hatta, M., Das, S. C., Ozawa, M., Shinya, K., Zhong, G., Hanson, A., Katsura, H., Watanabe, S., Li, C., Kawakami, E., Yamada, S., Kiso, M., Suzuki, Y., Maher, E. A., Neumann, G. and Kawaoka, Y. 2012, 'Experimental adaptation of an influenza H5 HA confers respiratory droplet transmission to a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets', Nature, vol.…”