Dual-use research and the H5N1 bird flu: Is restricting publication the solution to biosecurity issues?

Abstract

Recent studies altering the host range of the H5N1 bird flu virus have refueled intense debates over the potential misuse of academic life science research. To curtail the bioterrorism threat, it has been suggested that dissemination of the research results and methodology should be restricted. However, doubts have been raised over the suitability and effectiveness of this measure. Using the H5N1 studies as an example, this paper summarizes the main arguments of the debate. Particular attention is paid to the issue of the tacit knowledge required to replicate published life science research results, which has so far received limited attention. Taking into account the importance of tacit knowledge for life science research, it is argued that preventing publication of the methodology does not decrease the threat of bioterrorism.

Contiguous Governance of Synchronic and Diachronic Changes for the Use of Genome Editing Technologies

“…One practical approach to this pacing problem is a technological slowdown (Linstone, 1996;Woodhouse, 2016). Yet, moratoriums-an oft-used tactic for sensibly suspending scientific development by leaving the future open and taking time to consider the optimal decision (Chesneaux, 2000)-may not necessarily be a viable measure and may be criticized as empty gestures or pure public relations, as was the case of dual-use research on the H5N1 bird flu (Malakoff, 2012;Engel-Glatter, 2014). Moratoriums may even be rejected outright by technology-friendly countries for gene drives (Callaway, 2018).…”

Dangerous Science Science: Policy and Risk Analysis for Scientists and Engineers

“…The biggest remaining barrier is bridging the gap in tacit knowledge-the assumed professional knowledge, ignored or hidden details, and essential laboratory skills that are not recorded in the academic literature. However, even these hurdles are decreasing as modern communication lowers the cost of detailed knowledge transfer and as increasing numbers of experienced biotechnologists migrate from lab to lab (Engel-Glatter 2013;Revill & Jefferson 2013). Furthermore, many of the highly skilled and technical steps are being removed through automation.…”

Biosecurity in Emerging Life Sciences Technologies, a Canadian Public Health Perspective

“…In recent examples of research with the potential for dual use, international discussions focused on the risks of publication, with less emphasis on the need for systematic, scientific, evidence-based risk–benefit analysis in such research ( 5 , 6 ). In the absence of concrete data, as is the case with emerging technologies, this risk–benefit analysis may be largely hypothetical.…”