Escaping the International Governance Dilemma? Incorporated Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union

Eberlein, Burkard; Newman, Abraham L.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2007.00384.x

Cited by 183 publications

(129 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…These governance structures and processes may be more effectively directed toward adaptive ends (Ruhl 2011) with formal incorporation in environmental governance (Craik andDiMentio 2008, Erberlein andNewman 2008).…”

Section: Legally Binding Authoritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Legal and institutional foundations of adaptive environmental governance

DeCaro¹,

Chaffin²,

Schlager³

et al. 2017

E&S

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ABSTRACT. Legal and institutional structures fundamentally shape opportunities for adaptive governance of environmental resources at multiple ecological and societal scales. Properties of adaptive governance are widely studied. However, these studies have not resulted in consolidated frameworks for legal and institutional design, limiting our ability to promote adaptation and social-ecological resilience. We develop an overarching framework that describes the current and potential role of law in enabling adaptation. We apply this framework to different social-ecological settings, centers of activity, and scales, illustrating the multidimensional and polycentric nature of water governance. Adaptation typically emerges organically among multiple centers of agency and authority in society as a relatively self-organized or autonomous process marked by innovation, social learning, and political deliberation. This self-directed and emergent process is difficult to create in an exogenous, top-down fashion. However, traditional centers of authority may establish enabling conditions for adaptation using a suite of legal, economic, and democratic tools to legitimize and facilitate self-organization, coordination, and collaboration across scales. The principles outlined here provide preliminary legal and institutional foundations for adaptive environmental governance, which may inform institutional design and guide future scholarship.

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Section: Legally Binding Authoritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Legal and institutional foundations of adaptive environmental governance

DeCaro¹,

Chaffin²,

Schlager³

et al. 2017

E&S

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“…The model developed in this article is aimed at explaining that structure. The literature on European Regulatory Networks (key contributions include Coen and Thatcher 2008;Eberlein and Newman 2008;Kelemen and Tarrant 2011;Levi-Faur 2011;Maggetti and Gilardi 2011) and more generally on networks of regulators of network industries has, thus far, scarcely relied on the richness of insight that network theory and network analysis could afford it. In other words, the literature has often used the term "network" without using the methods pertaining to the quantitative analysis of networks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The drivers of regulatory networking: policy learning between homophily and convergence

Vantaggiato

2018

J. Pub. Pol.

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The literature on transnational regulatory networks identified interdependence as their main rationale, downplaying domestic factors. Typically, relevant contributions use the word "network" only metaphorically. Yet, informal ties between regulators constitute networked structures of collaboration, which can be measured and explained. Regulators choose their frequent, regular network partners. What explains those choices? This article develops an Exponential Random Graph Model of the network of European national energy regulators to identify the drivers of informal regulatory networking. The results show that regulators tend to network with peers who regulate similarly organised market structures. Geography and European policy frameworks also play a role. Overall, the British regulator is significantly more active and influential than its peers, and a divide emerges between regulators from EU-15 and others. Therefore, formal frameworks of cooperation (i.e. a European Agency) were probably necessary to foster regulatory coordination across the EU.

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“…Horizontal coordination is at the heart of different institutional innovations of the last decades. It is central to the phenomenon of 'agencification' (Egeberg 2003), i.e., the proliferation or EU regulatory agencies, which act as hubs of national regulators (Eberlein and Newman 2008). It is inherent to the principle of mutual recognition, which consists in states mutually recognizing the equivalence of each other's regulations (Nicolaidis 1996).…”

Section: Horizontal Demoi--cratizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For optimists, it could be seen as an answer to the 'governance dilemma' (Eberlein and Newman 2008) that consists in reconciling functional pressure for more integration with the sovereignty and identity concerns of the national demoi. Whether horizontal coordination necessarily produces demoi--cratic outcomes, however, and under what conditions, needs to be explored further.…”

Section: Horizontal Demoi--cratizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Demoi-cracy in the European Union: principles, institutions, policies

Cheneval¹,

Lavenex²,

Schimmelfennig³

2014

Journal of European Public Policy

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In a 'demoi--cracy', separate statespeoples enter into a political arrangement and jointly exercise political authority. Its proper domain is a polity of democratic states with hierarchical, majoritarian features of policy--making, especially in value--laden redistributive and coercive policy areas, but without a unified political community (demos). In its vertical dimension, demoi--cracy is based on the equality and interaction of citizens' and statespeoples' representatives in the making of common policies. Horizontally, it seeks to balance equal transnational rights of citizens with national policy--making autonomy. The EU belongs to the domain of demoi--cracy and has established many of its features. We argue that both vertical and horizontal demoi--cratization have been triggered by processes of supranational integration in the EU. They differ, however, in the origins and the outcomes. Vertical demoi--cratization has initially been a reaction of parliamentary institutional actors to majoritarian decision--making in regulatory policy--areas, resulting in the empowerment of the EP and the strengthening of parliamentary oversight at the national level. By contrast, horizontal demoi--cratization has been promoted by governments as an alternative to majoritarian and legally binding policy--making in core areas of statehood as well as coercive and redistributive policy--areas; it has resulted in soft, coordinative forms of policy--making, seeking to protect national autonomy. The extent to which these developments actually meet the normative standards of demoi--cracy in practice, however, is mixed.2

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Escaping the International Governance Dilemma? Incorporated Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union

Cited by 183 publications

References 62 publications

Legal and institutional foundations of adaptive environmental governance

Legal and institutional foundations of adaptive environmental governance

The drivers of regulatory networking: policy learning between homophily and convergence

Demoi-cracy in the European Union: principles, institutions, policies

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