2020
DOI: 10.1080/1057610x.2020.1835002
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Escalate to De-Escalate? External State Support and Governments’ Willingness to Negotiate

Abstract: Policymakers sometimes argue that material assistance to rebels involved in a civil war can create a 'ripe moment' that is favorable for negotiations. Ripeness theory provides support for this idea. However, this notion has never been systematically assessed. This article evaluates this claim by using global data on negotiations in all intrastate armed conflicts from 1975 to 2009. Contrary to popular belief, the article demonstrates that external state support to rebel groups does not increase the prospect of … Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(4 citation statements)
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References 27 publications
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“…The analysis suggests that the presence of a direct military intervention supporting the rebels can absorb some of the legitimacy and reputational costs for the government in a conflict and make negotiations more likely. This finding is contrary to results on rebel-side interventions by others (Kaplow 2016; Pechenkina and Thomas 2020; Karlén 2020) but in line with similar findings by Findley (2013) and Grieg (2015).…”
Section: Empirical Analysissupporting
confidence: 52%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The analysis suggests that the presence of a direct military intervention supporting the rebels can absorb some of the legitimacy and reputational costs for the government in a conflict and make negotiations more likely. This finding is contrary to results on rebel-side interventions by others (Kaplow 2016; Pechenkina and Thomas 2020; Karlén 2020) but in line with similar findings by Findley (2013) and Grieg (2015).…”
Section: Empirical Analysissupporting
confidence: 52%
“…The government, however, is often the side that needs to be convinced to negotiate (Bapat 2005; Asal et al 2019; Karlén 2020). The context of a civil war presents two particular barriers to negotiation from the perspective of the government: the potential reputational concerns and the risk of signaling weakness by agreeing to negotiate.…”
Section: Barriers To Negotiationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Regime type (Phayal et al, 2019), the number of insurgent organisations (Nilsson, 2010) and state capacity (DeRouen et al, 2010) influence the conflict outcome. Moreover, international involvement affects the probability of negotiations and peace agreements in intrastate conflicts (McKibben and Skoll, 2020;Karlén, 2020;Maekawa, 2019).…”
Section: Prediction and Explanations Of Peace Process Outcomesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…External support has been found to impact all aspects of the civil war process from conflict onset (Cunningham, 2016; Regan & Meachum, 2014), to conflict duration (Anderson 2019; Aydin & Regan, 2011; Cunningham, 2010; Roberts, 2019; Testerman 2015), spill-over to interstate conflict (Schultz, 2010), civil war negotiations (Karlén, forthcoming), conflict outcome (Jones, 2017; Lyall & Wilson, 2009; Sawyer, Cunningham & Reed 2017; McKibben & Skoll, 2021; Keels, Benson & Widmeier, forthcoming), conflict recurrence (Karlén, 2017), and democratic transitions (Colaresi, 2014). It shapes the form of contestation (Jackson, San-Akca & Maoz, 2020; Petrova, 2019), its lethality (Heger & Salehyan 2007) as well as levels of civilian abuse (Salehyan, Siroky & Wood, 2014) and sexual violence (Johansson & Sarwari, 2019).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%