Error theory and reasons for belief

Olson, Jonas

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511977206.006

Cited by 92 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…3). Opponents of realism include error-theorists like Olson (2011) and Streumer (2013) and expressivists like Chrisman (2007), Field (2009) and Gibbard (1990).…”

Section: B-absolutismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology

Carter

McKenna

2019

Erkenn

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This paper is about two topics: metaepistemological absolutism and the epistemic principles governing perceptual warrant. Our aim is to highlight-by taking the debate between dogmatists and conservativists about perceptual warrant as a case study-a surprising and hitherto unnoticed problem with metaepistemological absolutism, at least as it has been influentially defended by Paul Boghossian (Fear of knowledge: against relativism and constructivism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006a) as the principal metaepistemological contrast point to relativism. What we find is that the metaepistemological commitments at play on both sides of this dogmatism/conservativism debate do not line up with epistemic relativism nor do they line up with absolutism, at least as Boghossian articulates this position. What this case study reveals is the need in metaepistemological option space for the recognition of a weaker and less tendentious form of absolutism, what we call "environment relativism". On this view, epistemic principles are knowable, objective, and they can serve as the basis of particular epistemic evaluations, but their validity is relative to the wider global environment in which they are applied.

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“…3). Opponents of realism include error-theorists like Olson (2011) and Streumer (2013) and expressivists like Chrisman (2007), Field (2009) and Gibbard (1990).…”

Section: B-absolutismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology

Carter

McKenna

2019

Erkenn

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“…But since instrumentalism is true, this just means that there really are no moral reasons (see e.g. Mackie, 1977;Garner, 1990;Joyce, 2001;Olson, 2011aOlson, , 2011b. Similarly, epistemic instrumentalists can reply to TFER that although their view cannot accommodate evidential reasons, this just means that there are no such reasons.…”

Section: International Journal Of Philosophical Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See for instance Mackie, 1977;Garner, 1990, and Olson, 2011a, 2011b Nor am I committed to the claim that all pieces of evidence are also evidential reasons. On that alternative view, when C is an epistemic reason for S to Φ, that fact has this normative force for S because or in virtue of the fact that Φ-ing would realize or promote something valuable or good.…”

Section: Disclosure Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection

Côté-Bouchard

2015

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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“…The line of argument proceeds as follows. According to error theorists about epistemic reasons, there are no epistemic reasons for belief (seeOlson 2011). There is at least one epistemic error theorist-Jonas Olsson-and he has at least one belief.…”

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confidence: 99%

Epistemic norms, closure, and No-Belief hinge epistemology

2019

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Recent views in hinge epistemology rely on doxastic normativism to argue that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are not beliefs. This paper has two aims; the first is positive: it discusses the general normative credentials of this move. The second is negative: it delivers two negative results for No-Belief hinge epistemology such construed. The first concerns the motivation for the view: if we're right, doxastic normativism offers little in the way of theoretical support for the claim that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are anything but garden-variety beliefs. The second concerns theoretical fruitfulness: we show that embracing a No-Belief view will either get us in serious theoretical trouble, or loose all anti-sceptical appeal.

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Error theory and reasons for belief

Cited by 92 publications

References 0 publications

Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology

Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology

Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection

Epistemic norms, closure, and No-Belief hinge epistemology

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