Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism

Bex-Priestley, Graham

doi:10.1007/s10677-018-9945-z

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 12 publications

(3 reference statements)

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“…(For instance, if I am 37. Bex-Priestley (2018: 1059) develops a different argument to the same conclusion. 38.…”

Section: The Objectionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Ridge argues that such certainty is unreasonable, so I would already be guilty of an epistemic vice: "the fault here lies with the agent and not with the expressivist account of her judgement" (2015: 18). Perhaps so, but expressivism still seems to entail that I am guilty of a further epistemic vice-see Bex-Priestley (2018: 1059.…”

Section: The Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This debate has generated a small literature, including responses from Blackburn (2009), Lenman (2014), Horgan and Timmons (2015), Ridge (2015), and Bex-Priestley (2018). 3 These responses are inadequate-see §3.2.1.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Fallibility without Facts

Gamester

2022

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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If, as expressivists maintain, the function of normative thought and talk is not to represent or describe the world, then how can normative judgements be correct or incorrect? In particular, how can I make sense of my own normative fallibility, the possibility that my own normative judgements might be mistaken? In this paper, I construct and defend a substantive but non-representational theory of normative (in)correctness for expressivists. Inspired by Blackburn’s (1998: 318) proposal that I make sense of my fallibility in terms of the possibility that my judgements might be unstable through improvement, my account is designed in the first instance to vindicate the expressivist’s conception of the nature of normative inquiry. I then defend the proposal from the charge that it leaves insufficient room for my own fallibility, and in particular from Egan’s (2007) argument that it implies a “smug” asymmetry between myself and others. Critical to the response is the appeal to indeterminacy in cases of fundamental normative disagreement between reasonable normative outlooks.

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“…(For instance, if I am 37. Bex-Priestley (2018: 1059) develops a different argument to the same conclusion. 38.…”

Section: The Objectionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: The Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Fallibility without Facts

Gamester

2022

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Expressivism, Moral Fallibility, and the Approved Change Strategy

Bukoski

2021

J Ethics

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How to Have Your Quasi-Cake and Quasi-Eat It Too

Köhler

2021

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Quasi-realism prominently figures in the expressivist research program. However, many complain that it has become increasingly unclear what exactly quasi-realism involves. This paper offers clarification. It argues that we need to distinguish two distinctive views that might be and have been pursued under the label “quasi-realism”: conciliatory expressivism and quasi-realism properly so-called. Of these, only conciliatory expressivism is a genuinely meta-ethical project, while quasi-realism is a first-order normative view. This paper demonstrates the fruitfulness of these clarifications by using them to address Terence Cuneo’s recent challenge that quasi-realist expressivists lack the resources to plausibly accommodate certain sorts of data points.

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Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism

Cited by 4 publications

References 12 publications

Fallibility without Facts

Fallibility without Facts

Expressivism, Moral Fallibility, and the Approved Change Strategy

How to Have Your Quasi-Cake and Quasi-Eat It Too

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