According to expressivism, normative judgements are non-representational motivational states. Traditionally, this was understood as the commitment that normative judgements are not beliefs. However, quasi-realist expressivists have recently argued, via minimalism about "belief," that expressivism is compatible with normative judgements being beliefs. Quasi-realists have yet to explain, though, how they account for the contents of these beliefs. Specifically, they have not developed their preferred option, a "minimalist" or "deflationist" account of such contents. This paper remedies this gap.The paper proceeds as follows: Section one presents expressivism, quasirealism, and why quasi-realists need an account of the contents of normative beliefs.Section two explains why quasi-realists should resist William Dunaway's minimalist treatment of such contents. Section three introduces a general framework for deflationism about the contents of beliefs. Section four explains how this view fits with expressivism and allows expressivists to hold that normative judgements are beliefs. Expressivists' concession that normative judgements are beliefs forces us to revise our understanding of expressivism. The fourth section suggests how, and how it helps expressivists to account for the contents of normative beliefs. The section also sketches how to apply the account to other propositional attitudes. * I owe special thanks to Matthew Chrisman, Guido Ehrhardt, and Mike Ridge for numerous conversations on the topic of this paper and generous support. For helpful comments and criticisms of the paper in its various stages I would also like to thank
While the meta‐ethical error theory has been of philosophical interest for some time now, only recently a debate has emerged about the question what is to be done if the error theory turns out to be true. This paper argues for a novel answer to this question, namely revolutionary expressivism: if the error theory is true, we should become expressivists. Additionally, the paper explores certain important but largely ignored methodological issues that arise for reforming definitions generally and with a vengeance in the context of a radical error theory about all practical normative judgements, and suggests how these issues can be resolved.
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