Erratum: Is the Voter Model a Model for Voters? [Phys. Rev. Lett.<b>112</b>, 158701 (2014)]

Fernández-Gracia, Juan; Suchecki, Krzysztof; Ramasco, José J.; Miguel, M. San; Eguı́luz, Vı́ctor M.

doi:10.1103/physrevlett.113.089903

Cited by 44 publications

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“…This is a further motivation to consider a mixed dynamics as we are proposing here. On the other hand, regarding the VM, in spite of its simplicity it has been shown to capture some features of the way people behave in, e.g., electoral processes [30] and therefore it is a very suitable method to introduce the mechanisms of social imitation into an otherwise strategic problem.…”

Section: Model Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social imitation versus strategic choice, or consensus versus cooperation, in the networked Prisoner's Dilemma

et al. 2014

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The interplay of social and strategic motivations in human interactions is a largely unexplored topic in collective social phenomena. Whether individuals' decisions are taken in a purely strategic basis or due to social pressure without a rational background crucially influences the model outcome. Here we study a networked Prisoner's Dilemma in which decisions are made either based on the replication of the most successful neighbor's strategy (unconditional imitation) or by pure social imitation following an update rule inspired by the voter model. The main effects of the voter dynamics are an enhancement of the final consensus, i.e., asymptotic states are generally uniform, and a promotion of cooperation in certain regions of the parameter space as compared to the outcome of purely strategic updates. Thus, voter dynamics acts as an interface noise and has a similar effect as a pure random noise; furthermore, its influence is mostly independent of the network heterogeneity. When strategic decisions are made following other update rules such as the replicator or Moran processes, the dynamic mixed state found under unconditional imitation for some parameters disappears, but an increase of cooperation in certain parameter regions is still observed. Comparing our results with recent experiments on the Prisoner's Dilemma, we conclude that such a mixed dynamics may explain moody conditional cooperation among the agents.

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Section: Model Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social imitation versus strategic choice, or consensus versus cooperation, in the networked Prisoner's Dilemma

et al. 2014

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“…It has been used to model different phenomena in both the natural and social sciences, from catalytic reaction models [8,9] to the evolution of bilingualism [10] or US presidential elections [11]. The original voter model is defined as follows.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamical properties of the herding voter model with and without noise

Rozanova

Boguñá

2017

Phys. Rev. E

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Collective leadership and herding may arise in standard models of opinion dynamics as an interplay of a strong separation of time scales within the population and its hierarchical organization. Using the voter model as a simple opinion formation model, we show that, in the herding phase, a group of agents become effectively the leaders of the dynamics while the rest of the population follow blindly their opinion. Interestingly, in some cases such herding dynamics accelerates the time to consensus, which then become size independent or, on the contrary, makes the consensus nearly impossible. These new behaviors have important consequences when an external noise is added to the system that makes consensus (absorbing) states to disappear. We analyze this new model which shows an interesting phase diagram, with a purely diffusive phase, a herding (or two-states) phase, and mixed phases where both behaviors are possible.

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“…Recently, social physics has become an active research field, and many studies have been devoted to understanding the social phenomena and interacting human behaviors [1][2][3][4][5][6]. In the process of these studies, social learning plays the key role as a fundamental interaction among humans [1,2].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phase transition of social learning collectives and the echo chamber

Mori

Nakayama

Hisakado³

2016

Phys. Rev. E

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We study a simple model for social learning agents in a restless multi-armed bandit. There are N agents, and the bandit has M good arms that change to bad with the probability q c /N . If the agents do not know a good arm, they look for it by a random search (with the success probability q I ) or copy the information of other agents' good arms (with the success probability q O ) with probabilities 1 − p or p, respectively. The distribution of the agents in M good arms obeys the Yule distribution with the power-law exponent 1 + γ in the limit N, M → ∞ and γ = 1 +The system shows a phase transition at p c = q I q I +qo . For p < p c (> p c ), the variance of N 1 per agent is finite (diverges as ∝ N 2−γ with N ). There is a threshold value N s for the system size that scales as ln N s ∝ 1/(γ − 1). The expected value of the number of the agents with a good arm N 1

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Erratum: Is the Voter Model a Model for Voters? [Phys. Rev. Lett.112, 158701 (2014)]

Cited by 44 publications

References 0 publications

Social imitation versus strategic choice, or consensus versus cooperation, in the networked Prisoner's Dilemma

Social imitation versus strategic choice, or consensus versus cooperation, in the networked Prisoner's Dilemma

Dynamical properties of the herding voter model with and without noise

Phase transition of social learning collectives and the echo chamber

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