ERP signatures of conscious and unconscious word and letter perception in an inattentional blindness paradigm

Schelonka, Kathryn; Graulty, Christian; Canseco-Gonzalez, Enriqueta; Pitts, Michael

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2017.04.009

Cited by 38 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 90 publications

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“…This outcome accords with the proposal that awareness and the emergence of a P3 are strongly associated (Dehaene et al, 2006(Dehaene et al, , 2014. However, as discussed above, findings from noreport paradigms (Pitts et al, 2012;Shafto and Pitts, 2015;Schelonka et al, 2017) leave open the possibility that oddball effects on the P3 might not only depend on awareness, but on task-based attention. Thus, the current study aimed to elucidate how deviance processing interacts with awareness and task relevance using a roving oddball paradigm and a no-report procedure.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 88%

“…As a result, brain activity related to awareness might be confused with brain activity related to the report (Pitts et al, 2014;Tsuchiya et al, 2015). During no-report paradigms, a negative-going potential at posterior sites indexed stimulus awareness [visual awareness negativity (VAN); Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010;Pitts et al, 2012;Shafto and Pitts, 2015;Schelonka et al, 2017]. This contrasts with findings postulating late central positivities (P3) as a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC; Dehaene et al, 2006Dehaene et al, , 2014.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

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Differential Effects of Awareness and Task Relevance on Early and Late ERPs in a No-Report Visual Oddball Paradigm

et al. 2020

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To date it is poorly understood how and when deviance processing interacts with awareness and task relevance. Furthermore, an important issue in the study of consciousness is the prevalent confound of conscious perception with the requirement of reporting it. This study addresses these topics using a no-report inattentional blindness paradigm with a visual oddball sequence of geometrical shapes presented to male and female human participants. Electrophysiological responses were obtained in three physically identical Phases A-C that differed only with respect to the instructions: (A) participants were uninformed about the shapes and attended an unrelated foreground task (inattentional blind), (B) were informed about the shapes but still attended the foreground task, and (C) attended the shapes. Conscious processing of shapes was indexed by the visual awareness negativity but not a P3. Deviance processing was associated with the visual mismatch negativity independently of consciousness and task relevance. The oddball P3, however, only emerged when the stimuli were task relevant, and was absent for consciously perceived but task irrelevant stimuli. The P3 thus does not represent a reliable marker of stimulus awareness. This result pattern supports the view of hierarchical predictive processing, where lower levels display automatic deviance processing, whereas higher levels require attention and task relevance.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 88%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Differential Effects of Awareness and Task Relevance on Early and Late ERPs in a No-Report Visual Oddball Paradigm

et al. 2020

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“…So far, our group has explored two different approaches. In a series of inattentional blindness experiments, in the no-report conditions, subjects performed a moderately difficult luminance detection task on separate stimuli presented concurrently with the critical stimuli [77][78][79]. When the critical stimulus patterns (shapes, faces or letter strings) were unannounced and thus unexpected, about half of the subjects failed to note their presence (inattentional blindness).…”

Section: Conscious Perception Of Task-irrelevant Stimuli: Design Detamentioning

confidence: 99%

The relationship between attention and consciousness: an expanded taxonomy and implications for ‘no-report’ paradigms

Pitts

Lutsyshyna

Hillyard

2018

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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Tensions between global neuronal workspace theory and recurrent processing theory have sparked much debate in the field of consciousness research. Here, we focus on one of the key distinctions between these theories: the proposed relationship between attention and consciousness. By reviewing recent empirical evidence, we argue that both theories contain key insights and that certain aspects of each theory can be reconciled into a novel framework that may help guide future research. Alternative theories are also considered, including attended intermediate-level representations theory, integrated information theory and higher order thought theory. With the aim of offering a fresh and nuanced perspective to current theoretical debates, an updated taxonomy of conscious and non-conscious states is proposed. This framework maps a wider spectrum of conscious states by incorporating contemporary views from cognitive neuroscience regarding the variety of attentional mechanisms that are known to interact with sensory processing. Whether certain types of attention are necessary for phenomenal and access consciousness is considered and incorporated into this extended taxonomy. To navigate this expanded space, we review recent 'no-report' paradigms and address several methodological misunderstandings in order to pave a clear path forward for identifying the neural basis of perceptual awareness.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

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“…Visual awareness consistently correlates with a negative potential with onset at ∼200 ms and then a positive potential arising at ∼300 ms after stimulus presentation ( Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010 ; Rutiku et al, 2016 ; Rutiku and Bachmann, 2017 ). There is considerable variability between studies in the reported timing of these potentials but there is agreement that the negative potential (referred to as the visual awareness negativity) that occurs over the occipital-temporal-posterior parietal cortices is a signature of visual awareness ( Koch et al, 2016 ; Schelonka et al, 2017 ).…”

Section: Localization Of Pain Awareness In the Human Brainmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some of the temporal variability is associated with technical differences between studies. For instance, Schelonka et al (2017) recorded the largest amplitude of the negative potential between 320 and 380 ms post-stimulus, whereas Rutiku et al (2016) reported that the mean amplitude occurred at ∼240 ms and Shafto and Pitts (2015) timed the negative potential at ∼260–300 ms. Notwithstanding these differences, the timing of this potential is relatively late and not consistent with awareness arising solely from within the early visual cortex.…”

Section: Localization Of Pain Awareness In the Human Brainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

Key

Brown

2018

Front. Physiol.

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There is compelling evidence that the “what it feels like” subjective experience of sensory stimuli arises in the cerebral cortex in both humans as well as mammalian experimental animal models. Humans are alone in their ability to verbally communicate their experience of the external environment. In other species, sensory awareness is extrapolated on the basis of behavioral indicators. For instance, cephalopods have been claimed to be sentient on the basis of their complex behavior and anecdotal reports of human-like intelligence. We have interrogated the findings of avoidance learning behavioral paradigms and classical brain lesion studies and conclude that there is no evidence for cephalopods feeling pain. This analysis highlighted the questionable nature of anthropometric assumptions about sensory experience with increased phylogenetic distance from humans. We contend that understanding whether invertebrates such as molluscs are sentient should first begin with defining the computational processes and neural circuitries underpinning subjective awareness. Using fundamental design principles, we advance the notion that subjective awareness is dependent on observer neural networks (networks that in some sense introspect the neural processing generating neural representations of sensory stimuli). This introspective process allows the observer network to create an internal model that predicts the neural processing taking place in the network being surveyed. Predictions arising from the internal model form the basis of a rudimentary form of awareness. We develop an algorithm built on parallel observer networks that generates multiple levels of sensory awareness. A network of cortical regions in the human brain has the appropriate functional properties and neural interconnectivity that is consistent with the predicted circuitry of the algorithm generating pain awareness. By contrast, the cephalopod brain lacks the necessary neural circuitry to implement such an algorithm. In conclusion, we find no compelling behavioral, functional, or neuroanatomical evidence to indicate that cephalopods feel pain.

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ERP signatures of conscious and unconscious word and letter perception in an inattentional blindness paradigm

Cited by 38 publications

References 90 publications

Differential Effects of Awareness and Task Relevance on Early and Late ERPs in a No-Report Visual Oddball Paradigm

Differential Effects of Awareness and Task Relevance on Early and Late ERPs in a No-Report Visual Oddball Paradigm

The relationship between attention and consciousness: an expanded taxonomy and implications for ‘no-report’ paradigms

Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

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