Eroding the Middle Ground: The Shift in Foreign Policy Underpinning South African Nuclear Diplomacy

Leith, Rian; Pretorius, Joelien

doi:10.1080/02589341003600171

Cited by 14 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…At the time strong opposition to the proposal of indefinite extension came from some NAM members, who wanted among other factors to renegotiate more definite timelines for the Nuclear Weapon States' disarmament obligations under Article VI. Over time South Africa's nuclear diplomacy has shifted more towards non-alignmentsometimes by reflecting "support" for fellow NAM members and sometimes in taking an independent position on a matter under discussion (Leith & Pretorius 2010). There is, however, a sense that South Africa represents the interests of the Non-Aligned Movement in the NSG and, if it diverges from expressed 9) Brazil is an observer to the NAM, but not an official member.…”

Section: The Politics Of Denial: Restricting Article IV Rightsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Nuclear Politics of Denial: South Africa and the Additional Protocol

Pretorius

2013

Int Negot

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South Africa was one of the first states to conclude an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2002, allowing the IAEA greater right of access to safeguard nuclear activities and material. In light of this, some observers in the arms control community find it odd that South Africa's representatives at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) would be the main objectors to making the conclusion of an Additional Protocol a precondition for states wishing to import uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology (classified as sensitive nuclear technology and material). The South African objection should be viewed as only the most recent in a series of objections to measures that may seem obviously in line with nuclear non-proliferation. This emerging pattern in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy and, more specifically, the objection to the Additional Protocol condition are related to its membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and can be investigated through the lens of a politics of denial. Denial is the act of saying "no", but it is also in psychological parlance the unconscious thought process manifesting a refusal to acknowledge the existence of certain unpleasant aspects of external reality. It will be argued that South Africa's opposition to the Additional Protocol condition can be explained in the context of two instances of denial: (i) a perceived denial by the nuclear haves of what the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty codifies as an inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technologysomething that South Africa is cautious to be complicit in; and (ii) the nuclear weapon states' denial (the psychological meaning) of the unpleasant reality of a hypocritical nuclear order -something that South Africa wants to expose or at least something with which to engage to limit the effects for itself and other NAM members. The politics of denial does not yield to a pragmatist/utopian dichotomy in the nuclear realm, but instead reveals the dialectic nature of realism and idealism in nuclear politics, especially as reflected in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy.

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Section: The Politics Of Denial: Restricting Article IV Rightsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Nuclear Politics of Denial: South Africa and the Additional Protocol

Pretorius

2013

Int Negot

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“…Specifically in the case of South Africa's nuclear policy, Leith and Pretorius have shown that South Africa has moved from a middle-ground position towards a more revisionist position, signalling a move away from the North. 96 In alternative explanations, it has been argued that South Africa's opposition to the North's interpretation of international norms ought to be seen in the light of alternative norm entrepreneurship or shifting norm subsidiarity, 97 implicitly considered as benevolent. Similarly, South Africa's drive to transform international institutions and its preference for alternative venues has been generally conveyed as an expression of its altruistic desire for advancement and more voice for the less powerful countries of the globe.…”

Section: South African Jackal?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is, therefore, all the more surprising that the South African foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran's nuclear programme has received such scant academic attention. 3 South Africa is a global non-proliferation 'poster child', the only country to give up nuclear weapons and a member of all nuclear non-proliferation clubs. It sat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) during two sanction votes regarding Iran (UNSC Resolutions 1747 of 2007 and 1803 of 2008) and continues to be an influential voice in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, the main international non-proliferation organisation's top decisionmaking body.…”

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confidence: 99%

South Africa's Iran policy: ‘Poster child’ meets renegade

Onderčo

2012

South African Journal of International Affairs

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“…South Africa, similarly, is an obvious case for abstention from the PSI: like Brazil it is relatively isolated from security threats resulting from proliferation, and it has an uneasy attitude towards US power. South Africa's behaviour is puzzling if one accepts the narrative of South Africa as a non-proliferation norm promoter and 'a poster child', 101 long on the forefront of non-proliferation efforts. Moreover, South Africa is the single example of a state that has voluntarily given up its own nuclear weapons programme.…”

Section: South Africamentioning

confidence: 99%

Why is the Proliferation Security Initiative a Problematic Solution?: Table 1.

Onderčo

Hooft

2016

Chinese Journal of International Politics

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Informal institutions such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) have increasingly been at the forefront of global efforts to counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Yet a number of countries with strong non-proliferation credentials and incentives to stop likely proliferators have hesitated to join it. We use insights from alliance theory to explain this counterintuitive situation, and frame the decisions of states that are considering joining the PSI as maximizing between security, autonomy, and influence. We argue that while the PSI and similar institutions are comparatively flexible and less rigid in nature, they also exert a lesser constraint on the more powerful states than do international organizations (IO) which reduce uncertainty by freezing the existing hierarchies in place. We then look at a collection of states that vary in their positions on American hegemony, and find that security interests are predominantly decisive among hegemonic and supporter states and nuclear capable states, which are in favour of supporting the PSI, while counter-hegemonic motivations are largely decisive among states that reject the PSI. Consequently, the perceived lack of legitimacy of informal frameworks by states that are sceptical of US hegemony not only undermines the long-term effectiveness of such frameworks, but also reinforces scepticism of US hegemony. The desirability of increasing informalization of security arrangements should therefore be reappraised in the light of systemic stability.

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Eroding the Middle Ground: The Shift in Foreign Policy Underpinning South African Nuclear Diplomacy

Cited by 14 publications

References 3 publications

Nuclear Politics of Denial: South Africa and the Additional Protocol

Nuclear Politics of Denial: South Africa and the Additional Protocol

South Africa's Iran policy: ‘Poster child’ meets renegade

Why is the Proliferation Security Initiative a Problematic Solution?: Table 1.

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