2005
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2004.04.001
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Equity financing in a Myers–Majluf framework with private benefits of control

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Cited by 90 publications
(52 citation statements)
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References 60 publications
(137 reference statements)
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“…Firm size is a reasonable proxy for information asymmetries about new investment relative to those about assets in place. As argued by Wu and Wang (2005), the smaller a firm, the more asymmetric information concerns future growth opportunities rather than assets in place, suggesting that the coefficient of firm size should be negative. By the way, there is no correlation between Ln(MV) and Discount (p-values: 0.92, 0.35 and 0.61 for the pooled and the two separate -private and public placements -samples, respectively).…”
Section: Determinants Of Announcement Effects Of Private and Public Pmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Firm size is a reasonable proxy for information asymmetries about new investment relative to those about assets in place. As argued by Wu and Wang (2005), the smaller a firm, the more asymmetric information concerns future growth opportunities rather than assets in place, suggesting that the coefficient of firm size should be negative. By the way, there is no correlation between Ln(MV) and Discount (p-values: 0.92, 0.35 and 0.61 for the pooled and the two separate -private and public placements -samples, respectively).…”
Section: Determinants Of Announcement Effects Of Private and Public Pmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…where R it is daily return on issuing firm i, R mt is daily value-weighted market return, SMB (Cooney and Kalay, 1993;Wu and Wang, 2005;Eckbo and Norli, 2005a). For example, Wu and Wang (2005) predict that positive announcement effects are more likely to occur if the asymmetric information arises more from investment opportunities than from assets in place (see also Ambarish, John and Williams, 1987, in a non-Myers-Majluf context).…”
Section: Announcement Effects Of Private and Public Placements In Honmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Consistent with Jensen's argument, the model predicts that corporate managers use internal funds to invest in projects with a lower marginal value to shareholders than marginal cost. Wu and Wang (2005) consider a model similar to the one of Myers and Majluf (1984) but assume that managers derive private benefits of control from overinvestment. They find that private benefits amplify overinvestment but alleviate underinvestment.…”
Section: Increasing Managerial Powermentioning
confidence: 99%