Equality and Efficiency shape Cooperation in Multiple-Public Goods Provision Problems

Abstract

The functioning of groups and societies requires that individuals cooperate on public goods such as healthcare and state defense. While psychological science has addressed cooperation and public good provision, it has largely ignored situations in which individuals face multiple public goods and must choose on which to cooperate. Such decisions can be difficult when public goods are attractive on one dimension (e.g., being ‘efficient’ in providing comparatively high returns) and unattractive on another (e.g., providing unequal rather than equal returns to group members). Here we examined (expectations about) cooperation in multiple-public good provision problems using four incentivized and preregistered experiments (N = 774). Participants simultaneously faced two public goods that varied in efficiency and (in)equality of returns. Results showed more cooperation on the comparatively efficient public good (Exp. 1) and on the equal-return (vs. unequal-return) public good. Crucially, however, when the unequal-returns public good was also the most efficient, individuals cooperated comparatively more on this unequal-but-efficient public good when they themselves benefitted the most from inequality (Exp. 2—4). Low beneficiaries largely ignored public good efficiency and preferentially cooperated on equal- rather than unequal-returns public goods. Consequently, groups encountering multiple-public good provision problems including an unequal-but-efficient-returns public good were most cooperative. Expectations (Exp. 2—4) as well as preferences for revising the multiple-public good provision problems’ choice architecture (Exp. 3—4) echoed these cooperation patterns. We discuss implications for theory and policy on cooperation.

Group Formation and the Evolution of Human Social Organization

“…Club goods also create collective-action problems that groups need to manage. First, some individuals may benefit less from (some) club goods than others and may thus be less motivated to contribute (Gross & Böhm, 2020;Hoenig et al, 2023a;Van Dijk & Wilke, 1993). Second, not only contributors but also noncontributors benefit from club goods-even those who did not contribute to building a wall are protected against dangerous predators.…”

“…Both leaders and their followers may benefit those within their subgroup more readily than those outside their subgroup, and such parochialism can undermine cohesion and cooperation with the overarching collective (e.g., Dovidio et al, 1998;Gross et al, 2023;Molenmaker et al, 2023). Likewise, some club goods within multilayered collectives may benefit some group members more than others, and cooperation can thus create wealth disparities within the overarching collective Hoenig et al, 2023aHoenig et al, , 2023b. Feelings of deprivation and envy within disadvantaged subgroups can set the stage for protest and conflict, ultimately leading to the disintegration of the overarching collective.…”