Political ideology and moral dilemmas in public good provision

Hoenig, Laura C.; Pliskin, Ruthie; Dreu, Carsten K. W. De

doi:10.1038/s41598-023-29512-0

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 53 publications

(47 reference statements)

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“…Taking our investigation a step further, we examined individual variations in behavior and uncovered distinct moral principles held by people, recognizing that people may espouse diverse beliefs about moral decision-making [17,18]. The rst cluster, comprising the majority of participants, displayed both rankreversal aversion and inequality aversion.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-Interest Overrides Rank-Reversal Aversion in Resource Distribution

Kim,

Kim

2024

Preprint

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The equitable allocation of resources has long been a central concern for humanity, prompting extensive research into various motivations that drive the pursuit of distributive justice. In contrast to one of the most fundamental motives, inequality aversion, a conflicting motive has been proposed: rank-reversal aversion. However, it remains unclear whether this rank-reversal aversion persists in the presence of self-rank. Here we provide evidence of rank-reversal aversion in the first-party context and explore diverse moral strategies for distribution. In a modified version of the redistribution game involving 55 online-recruited participants, we observed rank-reversal aversion only when one’s rank was maintained. When participants’ self-rank was altered, they tended to base their behavior on their new ranks. This behavioral tendency varied among individuals, revealing three distinct moral strategies, all incorporating considerations of rank-reversal. Our findings suggest that rank-reversal aversion can indeed influence one’s distribution behavior, although the extent of its impact may vary among individuals, especially when self-rank is a factor. These insights can be extended to political and economic domains, contributing to a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms of distributive justice.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-Interest Overrides Rank-Reversal Aversion in Resource Distribution

Kim,

Kim

2024

Preprint

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“…Finally, cooperation leads to optimal benefits for the supply chain system [51]. The cooperation selection mode of the general contractor and subcontractor is not related to the degree of contribution, and the general contractor prefers the egoistic decision mode, while the subcontractor prefers the centralist decision mode.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Model and Simulation of Benefit Distribution of Collaborative Cooperation in the Supply Chain of General Contracting Projects

Wang

Gao

2023

Buildings

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In the supply chain of general contracting projects, there are many participating entities, which can easily lead to conflicts of interest and resources. In order to fully mobilize the enthusiasm of general contractors and subcontractors, achieve stability, maximize the benefits of the supply chain system, and improve the operational efficiency of the supply chain, it is necessary to design a scientifically reasonable mechanism for benefit distribution to coordinate the relationships between all members. This paper takes the general contractor and subcontractor in the supply chain of the general contracting project as the research objects and uses the Cobb–Douglas function to establish the benefit distribution model of the cooperation between the two in the supply chain system and analyzes the benefit distribution problem of the one-time cooperation and multiple cooperation between the two parties in the two decision-making modes of egoism and collectivism. The results show that in the case of one-time cooperation between general contractors and subcontractors, regardless of the decision mode, the degree of effort of both parties is positively related to their contributions and negatively related to each other’s contributions; the overall benefit of the supply chain system is positively proportional to the degree of contribution of the general contractor and inversely proportional to the share of benefit distribution of the subcontractor. In multiple cooperation, the equilibrium result of both parties achieving Pareto optimality at each stage is that both parties choose to cooperate.

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“…In Part 1, participants completed several personality measures, including the social value orientation (SVO) slider (Murphy et al, 2011) capturing SVO and inequality aversion. The other personality measures served research questions outside the scope of the present manuscript and are reported in Hoenig et al (2023) (see https://aspredicted.org/IIV_LVO). The very few and minor deviations from the preregistration are detailed in the online supplemental materials.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equality and efficiency shape cooperation in multiple-public-goods provision problems.

Hoenig,

Pliskin,

De Dreu

2024

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

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Political ideology and moral dilemmas in public good provision

Cited by 9 publications

References 53 publications

Self-Interest Overrides Rank-Reversal Aversion in Resource Distribution

Self-Interest Overrides Rank-Reversal Aversion in Resource Distribution

Model and Simulation of Benefit Distribution of Collaborative Cooperation in the Supply Chain of General Contracting Projects

Equality and efficiency shape cooperation in multiple-public-goods provision problems.

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