Epistemological depth in a GM crops controversy

Abstract

This paper examines the scientific controversy over the yields of genetically modified [GM] crops as a case study in EPISTEMOLOGICALLY DEEP disagreements. Appeals to "the evidence" are inadequate to resolve such disagreements; not because the interlocutors have radically different metaphysical views (as in cases of incommensurability), but instead because they assume rival epistemological frameworks and so have incompatible views about what kinds of research methods and claims count as evidence. Specifically, I show that, in the yield debate, proponents and opponents of GM crops cite two different sets of claims as evidence, which correspond to two rival epistemological frameworks, classical experimental epistemology and Nancy Cartwright's evidence for use. I go on to argue that, even if both sides of the debate accepted Cartwright's view, they might still disagree over what counts as evidence, because evidence for use ties standards of evidence to what is sometimes called the "context of application."

A tipping point for agricultural expansion? Technological changes and capital accumulation in Argentina's rural sector

“…Likewise, in the province of Córdoba, the average yield 15 Some authors are critical of his standpoint (Brester, Atwood, Watts, & Kawalski, 2019;Eddy, 2009), whereas others support it (Moore, 2010;Tokar & Magdoff, 2009). Hicks (2015) makes an excellent analysis of this debate, showing how these contrasting positions present two different sets of claims as evidence, which are supported on two rival epistemological frameworks. Stone (2012) focuses on the narratives supporting GM adoption and discusses some of the risks and fallacies incurred by those who defend yield supremacy of GM seeds over conventional ones.…”

The resisted rise of randomisation in experimental design: British agricultural science, c.1910–1930

“…Nor could either method claim superiority over the other when it came to goal C, the management of widely variable conditions, because incommensurate epistemic criteria are being appealed to, so that it is not even possible to agree on the most appropriate means of solving the debate (Hicks 2015). Fortunately (and inevitably) argument spilled over into other concerns.…”

“…Firstly, attention to the epistemic goals of experimental programmes (Ankeny and Leonelli 2011), is crucial for understanding choice of experimental method, explaining why experimenters sometimes sharply disagree -and in cases where different evidentiary standards are in play cannot agree (Hicks 2015) -as to the best method to adopt. Secondly, thanks to the material form that it imposes on experimental resources, randomisation is prejudicial to certain epistemic goals and values that otherwise might be accommodated (Elliott and McKaughan 2014), and which therefore must be accounted for whenever randomisation is employed.…”

Genetically Modified Crops, Inclusion, and Democracy

“…these arguments, biotechnology is useful -perhaps even necessary -to increase global food production and promote food security. "Feed the world" arguments are considered so important that an agricultural biotechnology industry organization "communicator's guide" identifies feeding the world as one of its four "key messages" (Food Biotechnology 2013; for critical discussion of these arguments, see Lacey 2002;Hicks 2015).…”

“…In this respect, my paper does not aim to provide a review of food regime concerns (for such reviews, see Lacy 2002; Thompson and Hannah 2008;Hicks and Millstein 2016). My concern here is not with whether GM crops are actually safe or pose a threat to human health; similarly, I am not directly concerned here with whether GM crops actually have greater yields than their conventional counterparts (on this, see Hicks 2015), contribute to farm consolidation, or exacerbate economic inequality. I also assume, rather than argue, that some GM opponents hold and attempt to raise food regime concerns -I take it that the literature cited above supports that empirical claim.…”