Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion

Egan, Andrew

doi:10.1007/s11098-006-9003-x

Cited by 225 publications

(189 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…8 The canon as such is non-committal about how context can decide the relevant body of information that bems quantify over. So it is compatible with insisting that the relevant body of information represents some pooling of the information available to the relevant group of agents and it is compatible with insisting that the relevant body of information represents not merely what those agents know but what they may come to know-what is, borrowing Egan's (2007) nice phrasing, within their epistemic reach.…”

Section: The Canonmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 2 Some recent CIA agents: Egan (2007); Egan et al (2007); MacFarlane (this volume); Stephenson (2007a,b). 3 More generally, the interpretation of modal is a quantifier Q D over domain D, the value of D being a function of context or the preceding discourse and the modal saying that Q D of the possibilities in B are possibilities in which the prejacent is true.…”

Section: The Canonmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Pragmatics of Insensitive Assessments

Björnsson¹,

Almer²

2010

Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communica

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Section: The Canonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Canonmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Pragmatics of Insensitive Assessments

Björnsson¹,

Almer²

2010

Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communica

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“…6 Remember the set-up. Thales sincerely utters w; Cavendish sincerely utters ¬w; and Thales and Cavendish seem to thereby disagree.…”

Section: The Disagreement Thesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism

Spencer

2016

Mind

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“…It is the crucial issue for Lasersohn (2005), which I shall discuss at length below. Though there are some minor differences, it also captures one of the core issues for such discussions as Egan (2007), Egan et al (2005), and Stanley (2005). MacFarlane (2005) questions whether semantic value relativism is the right way to frame the issue of relativism.…”

Section: Some Historymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 Other recent cases for semantic value relativism include Egan (2007), Egan et al (2005), Kölbel (2002), and MacFarlane (2003.…”

Section: As Lasersohn Makes Clear Thismentioning

confidence: 99%

Context, content, and relativism

2007

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Forthcoming in Philosophical StudiesHere is a simple and inviting picture: the semantic values of sentences, relative to contexts, are sets of possible worlds. These are the truth conditions of assertions of those sentences in contexts. They are thus the contents of assertions, or the objects of attitudes we might take towards such contents.There have been many questions raised about the simple picture. For instance, sets of worlds might well be too coarse-grained to capture fully the objects of attitudes, leading to more fine-grained or structured contents. But opting for structure does not conflict with truth conditions being sets of worlds, and so, I shall ignore this sort of question. I shall likewise ignore questions about the nature of possible worlds.I propose to ignore these questions to focus on whether the semantic values of sentences should be sets of something more than possible worlds. For instance, it has frequently been proposed that semantic values should be sets of pairs of worlds and times. The simple picture opts for eternalism: semantic values of sentences are eternal truth conditions. This stand in * Versions of this paper were presented at a symposium on relativism at the Pacific APA, 2006, the 'Cog Lunch' at CSLI, 2006 contrast to temporalism, which holds that semantic values are time-relative truth conditions. Temporalism has been subject to a number of criticisms; from Enç (1984Enç ( , 1986, from Evans (1985), from King (2003), and from Richard (1981Richard ( , 1982. I shall not be particularly concerned to argue against temporalism here, though I find these criticisms persuasive, and I shall be assuming eternalism. The question on which I shall focus here is whether, on the model of temporalism, we should see any other additions to worlds in the semantic values of sentences. Leaving times to one side, we can distinguish two sorts of positions: Semantic value absolutism:The semantic values of sentences are sets of worlds. Semantic value relativism:The semantic values of sentences are sets of tuples of worlds and other parameters, relative to which the truth of a sentence in a context is determined.The particular form of semantic value relativism I shall discuss most in this paper posits that semantic values of sentence are sets of pairs of worlds and judges. The judge assesses certain claims, like what counts as fun.As proponents of such views are clearly aware, this is a form of relativism about truth.We can get no truth value from the content of an assertion until we fix the judge relative to whom it is true. But defenders of this sort of semantic value relativism are quick to point out they are not repeating the mistake, all too common among our undergraduates, of just thinking that truth is 'truth for me, and truth for you'. Rather, they argue, there are semantic phenomena we cannot make sense of without making room for relative truth.Furthermore, they will argue, this semantically motivated relativism is more modest, and more sensible, than our undergraduates' version, and so is no...

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Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion

Cited by 225 publications

References 6 publications

The Pragmatics of Insensitive Assessments

The Pragmatics of Insensitive Assessments

Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism

Context, content, and relativism

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