The Pragmatics of Insensitive Assessments

Björnsson, Gunnar; Almer, Alexander

doi:10.4148/biyclc.v6i0.1562

Cited by 6 publications

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References 13 publications

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“…Dorr and Hawthorne (2013) also find more nuance in intuitions about a related problem of giving a response to Yalcin's puzzle (2007). Another way to diffuse the objection claims that even if we do have the simple intuitions that I described above, it could be that these intuitions are in error (Björnsson & Almér, 2010;Björnsson & Finlay, 2010;Finlay, 2014). We might be systematically confused in thinking that there is no shiftiness in terms like "likely" by such cases when, in fact, looking at the entire semantic and pragmatic theory shows that such an account is most plausible.…”

Section: Appendix Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

Credences are Beliefs about Probabilities: A Defense from Triviality

Lennertz

2023

Erkenn

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Section: Appendix Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

Credences are Beliefs about Probabilities: A Defense from Triviality

Lennertz

2023

Erkenn

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Recommending beauty: semantics and pragmatics of aesthetic predicates

Salas

Milić

2016

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Disagreement, Correctness, and the Evidence for Metaethical Absolutism

Björnsson¹

2015

Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 10

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Metaethical absolutism, or just absolutism, is the view that moral concepts have non-relative satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges and their particular beliefs, attitudes, and cultural embedding. Absolutism is compatible with a variety of more widely discussed views about moral semantics-descriptivist and non-descriptivist, naturalist and non-naturalist, realist and constructivist-but it arguably has more practically important consequences than either of these. If absolutism is true, there is an important sense in which parties of moral disputes are concerned to get the same things right, such that their disputes can be settled by the facts. If it is not true, as various forms of relativism and non-cognitivism imply, such coordination of concerns will be limited. 2 The most influential support for absolutism comes from two related premises. According to the first, moral thinking and moral discourse display a number of features that are characteristically found in paradigmatically absolutist domains, and only partly in uncontroversially non-absolutist domains. Among these features, we find ways of thinking about moral disagreement, and ways of attributing correctness to moral judgments. According to the second premise, the best way of making sense of these features is to assume that absolutism holds for this domain. Moral thinking and discourse display a certain unity that would be less straightforwardly explained if forms of metaethical relativism or non-cognitivism were true. 3 One can object to this argument from unity in two ways. One might reject the first premise, denying that morality displays "absolutist" patterns of disagreement. Or one might 1 I am grateful for feedback from audiences at

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The Pragmatics of Insensitive Assessments

Cited by 6 publications

References 13 publications

Credences are Beliefs about Probabilities: A Defense from Triviality

Credences are Beliefs about Probabilities: A Defense from Triviality

Recommending beauty: semantics and pragmatics of aesthetic predicates

Disagreement, Correctness, and the Evidence for Metaethical Absolutism

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