Epistemic feelings in moral experiences and moral dynamics of everyday life

Abstract

The philosophy of emotions has identified a class of affective phenomena called epistemic feelings (e.g. certainty, doubt, or surprise). Such feelings are thought to inform about the quality of one's knowledge and beliefs and to influence processes of knowledge acquisition and belief formation (1). I shall argue that these feelings also inform about the quality of one's (moral) emotions and hence are important to understand everyday moral experiences and the moral dynamics resulting from them. The works of Hans Joas are a good starting point to substantiate this argument, because he relates, albeit implicitly, some epistemic feelings to particular moral experiences (2). Inspired by this analysis of Joas, I differentiate between three ideal typical moral dynamics (moral elaboration, moral relativization and moral closure), which can be induced by specific moral experiences (3). The empirical study of epistemic feelings presents some challenges (4). But such an endeavour promises to increase our understanding of processes of moral reproduction and transformation, and of the development of phenomena like moral dogmatism, moral opportunism, and moral scepticism (5). Keywords epistemic feelings, moral experiences, moral dynamics Sentiments epistemològics en les experiències morals i dinàmiques morals en la vida quotidiana Resum La filosofia de les emocions ha identificat una classe de fenomen afectiu anomenat sentiments epistemològics (com ara la certesa, el dubte o la sorpresa). Es considera que aquests sentiments informen sobre la qualitat del coneixement i les creences d'una persona i influencien els processos d'adquisició de coneixement i formació de creences (1).

Into the 21st century

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